From the outset of the Libyan episode, there have been ample grounds for reservation. Both the manner in which events have unfolded, and also the longer-term implications, are troubling.

Objections to the lack of public debate, to NATO’s tendency to reach for the gun before exhausting all alternatives to the use of armed force, to the ambitious pursuit of goals well beyond those authorized  by the UN Security Council,  and to the near complete incoherence of Western policy in the region seem well-founded. Quite apart from the unknown number of people killed during the rebellion, respect for international law and for the doctrine of the Responsibility to Protect have been among the more notable casualties.

The broader concern is that for NATO participants, policy has become an instrument of war.   But that, and a host of other issues remain unaddressed. With Gadhafi’s execution, these kinds of considerations have by and large been lost in the orgy of triumphalism and self-congratulation.

It may be that the Western military intervention in support of one side in a civil war was the best available among a limited selection of  bad options, and that a new Libya, launched down a  path of democracy, security, prosperity, and respect for human rights, is set to become a model. I hope so. But most of those attributes are without antecedent in Libya. I can’t shake the feeling that it is still way too soon to break out the champagne.

Why worry?

Deprived of a common enemy, the various factions within the ruling Transnational National Council (TNC) now have little to keep them united. Inevitable differences will arise over the distribution of power and the dispensing of patronage, not to mention the division of the spoils. These issues will be exacerbated by Libya’s long history of regional, ethnic and tribal divisions. Tensions of this nature will be challenging to contain and manage.

With the uncontrolled pillaging of Gadhafi’s armouries, the country is awash with weapons of all description, and untrained militias roam the streets. Some will be keen to settle accounts and will seek revenge through reprisals. All of this will be difficult to control and roll back.

The received wisdom notwithstanding, the Gadhafi who for a while had become the toast of the town when he changed foreign policy direction, settled with the Lockerbie bombing victims, renounced support for terrorism and terminated his efforts to develop weapons of mass destruction, was  not universally reviled within his country. Although his erratic, eccentric and sometimes brutal behaviour made it easy to slot him as a cartoon cut-out, the very  caricature of a loony despot, by comparative measure, he was not particularly corrupt and had some real achievements to his credit.

Gadhafi  worked hard for African unity and financial independence. He invested oil revenues in support of national needs, and spent substantially on domestic  infrastructure such as schools, hospitals and roads.  Development indicators, such as literacy and infant mortality rates, were the best in the region, and this may account for the fact that Libya topped all other African countries in the UN’s Human Development Index.

Much of this legacy will have been lost in the seven months of NATO bombardment, and that may help to explain why not all of Africa is celebrating.

With the NATO military mission scheduled to end October 31, the centre of the international action will shift to trade and investment promotion, and to competition for lucrative resource and reconstruction contracts. Yet driven by the relentless pressures of the 24/7 news cycle and popular preferences for infotainment, the legions of journalists who covered the fall of Sirte have largely moved on. As a result, in the aftermath of the conflict and short of a resumption of full-blown hostilities, over the coming months we are unlikely to hear all that much about NATO’s new protectorate, or its proxies in the TNC.

That is unfortunate, for in the case of the latest exercise of Western military intervention, the proof will be in the pudding.

Looking back over decade since 9/11, what events and developments stand out globally? Among others:

• The ongoing Global War on Terror and associated Western military interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan.

• The hollowing out of the middle class, the financial crisis and the continuing Great Recession.

• The lost opportunities to support non-violent political reform during the Arab Spring.

9/11 changed everything, and the carnage and consequences engendered by that day haunt us still.

The Twin Towers episode was tragic, but not just on account of the mass fatalities. It provided the neoconservative ideologues in the Bush administration with the pretext they needed to seize control of the domestic and international agendas, and entrench the politics of fear. On their watch, human rights were systematically violated and torture legalized, while military and intelligence spending increased vastly. With this came not only Guantonamo Bay and Abu Ghraib; a network of “black” prisons and interrogation centres was established world-wide, and “extraordinary renditions” kept up the flow of detainees.  On the home front, taxes were cut, civil and constitutional rights were rolled back, and the national security and surveillance state constructed. Meanwhile, and as demonstrated indelibly during the failed response to Hurricane Katrina, the federal government’s program and service infrastructure was gutted.

For the USA, 9/11 was the trip wire which marked the beginning of the end of the unipolar moment. Its aftermath has bankrupted America’s economy, destroyed its reputation, squandered its global leadership, and ensured that the country remains the object of anger and resentment throughout the Arab and Islamic world.

Remarkably, some elements of this misguided response – the drone strikes, covert operations and targeted assassinations – have been ramped up under President Obama. Despite some new packaging, the past four years have seen more continuity than change in American policy.

For friends of the USA, that is worrisome.

Still reaching for the gun

Take, for instance, the Arab Spring. We have witnessed a convincing expression of the people’s thirst for reform. Moreover, that conviction has been expressed in an overwhelmingly secular manner, with the more extreme iterations of radical Islamism notable mainly for their absence. That observation, which not coincidentally relates directly back to the implications of 9/11, may represent the Arab Spring’s most enduring legacy. Either way, one would have thought that lending support to the forces of democratic progress, particularly in the face of concerns over violent Islamic extremism, would have been an obvious choice.

Instead, the West stood by as Tunisia and Egypt erupted, and chose to intervene militarily in the Libyan civil war. The result in most cases has been that beyond cosmetic changes in the top level leadership, very little of substance has really changed.  Labels notwithstanding, these uprisings are a far cry from revolution. And meanwhile, confronted by the stirrings in Jordan, revolts in Bahrain and Yemen, and a full scale rebellion in Syria, NATO’s response has been mute or incoherent.

There is a better way. In the age of globalization, development – long term, equitable, sustainable – has become the new basis for world security. At the level of grand strategy, that means that diplomacy must replace defence at the centre of international policy.

Until that lesson is taken to heart, the toll of 9/11 will continue to mount

True north in transition

How has 9/11 changed Canada? Profoundly, but – like so much else – in a manner mainly resembling a miniature replica of the USA..

Although the metamorphosis here began well before the change of government in 2006, the nature and orientation of contemporary Conservative foreign policy differs significantly from that of previous Liberal and Progressive Conservative  governments.

At the highest level of analysis, it could not be clearer that the overall international policy emphasis and mix associated with this country has shifted. Adulation of the military, and a general preference for the use of armed force has been placed front and centre, at the expense of both diplomacy and development assistance. Ten years ago the rallying cry for defence recruitment was “There’s no life like it”. Now, it’s “Fight”. Accordingly, there has been an acceleration in the transformation of the structure of the Canadian Forces, away from peacekeeping in favour of expeditionary war fighting. This redirection has been evident in both the prosecution of an ambitious – if ill-fated – counter-insurgency campaign in Kandahar, and in the enthusiastic participation in the NATO bombing and embargo in support of regime change in Libya.

At a speech in Trapani Italy delivered on September 1^st to members of the (Royal) Canadian Forces, Prime Minister Harper averred that “a handful of soldiers is better than a mouthful of arguments”. The following week in an interview he stated that “Islamicist” terrorism represents the foremost threat facing Canada.

So much for any kind of preference for nonviolent conflict resolution… not to mention according priority to the pressing need to address global issues such as climate change, diminishing biodiversity, nuclear proliferation, and environmental degradation. Unlike terrorism, any one of these threats could take down not just Canada, but large swathes of the world.

The Conservatives have emphasized Canada’s relations with the Americas – for the first four years at the expense of relations with China and India, which were ineptly managed. Free trade agreements have been pursued with a number of Latin American countries, while relations with African states have been marked by embassy closures and the concentration of aid expenditures on a more limited number of countries. A tilt towards the unconditional support for Israel has become the hallmark of Canadian policy on issues of Middle East politics and the regional peace process more broadly.

Under the Conservatives the foreign ministry (DFAIT) does not appear to enjoy the confidence, trust and respect which it once did. Once a leader in public diplomacy, the imposition of the – chillingly Orwellian – Message Event Proposal requirement means that the department’s staff cannot have an unscripted conversation outside the Pearson building and are now effectively gagged. There seems to be little appetite for the Department’s advice, and it is not being called upon to develop new international policy initiatives.

All of this may well have contributed to Canada’s shocking failure to win a seat on the UN Security Council.

Breaking with the past

The extent of the remaking of Canada’s role and place in the world becomes especially clear when the meagre international policy content of the last four years (under four foreign ministers) are compared, for instance, to the three and a half years of activist diplomacy in the late nineties under Lloyd Axworthy. During that period, with a lot of assistance from DFAIT, Canadian leadership helped to achieve a treaty to land mines, an International Criminal Court, and major initiatives on blood diamonds, children in conflict and humanitarian intervention (The Responsibility to Protect).

The contrast between the pursuit of the Human Security Agenda and the current level of inactivity is striking. Yet the post-9/11 departure from previous foreign policies has deeper roots.
Under PM Mulroney, Canada spearheaded the organization of the UN’s Rio Conference on Environment and Development, which produced the Framework Convention on Climate Change; the Statement of International Forestry Principles; the Biodiversity Convention, and; Agenda 21. Canada negotiated the FTA and NAFTA; it concluded treaties on acid rain and the protection of the ozone layer (Montreal Protocol), and; it worked within the Commonwealth to end apartheid in southern Africa.

These were significant diplomatic enterprises; the extent of the discontinuity with the present is unmistakable.

Grand strategy?

Moving forward, we are entering uncharted territory. As power and influence diffuse to other parts of the planet, the key challenge will be to manage the necessary accommodation more successfully in this century than was the case during the last, which was marked by two world wars and a Cold War.

Initial indications, however, are not encouraging.

There are few signs of any kind of grand strategy guiding Canada’s response to the re-emergence, after 400 years, of the Asia-Pacific region as the dynamic centre of the global political economy. Next year, in order to save $10 million, Canada will be alone among G-20 countries in its absence at  the Expo 2012 world’s fair in Yeosu, Korea. The theme of the Expo is “The Living Ocean and Coast” with sub themes of “Preservation and Sustainable Development of the Ocean and Coast,” “New Resources Technology,” and “Creative Marine Activities.”

Canada has the longest shoreline in the world, with frontage on three oceans…

Identity makeover

Over the course of the decade since 9/11, and more drastically over the past five years, Canada’s international image and reputation – our brand – have been fundamentally recast.  The once familiar helpful fixer, honest broker, generous aid donor and boy scout to the world has today become something quite different.

It would be in the interest of all Canadians – and perhaps even beyond – if the reconstruction of the Canadian brand were to be more widely acknowledged, debated and discussed.

It is perhaps premature to propose potential conclusions and lessons learned in the immediate wake of the rebel victory over the Gadhafi regime. On the surface, it appears that NATO support for the rebellion assisted materially in achieving the objective of ridding Libya of a widely detested dictator.

In terms of success, this would seem to represent more than can be said for Western efforts in backing one side in the Afghan civil war, or intervening under manifestly false pretences in Iraq. Both of those episodes have proven extremely costly. Still, before breaking out any more champagne, there are several issues regarding the Libyan affair which require more sober and sustained reflection than they seem to have received at the international meeting on Libya’s future held September 1st in Paris.

The rule of law. UN Security Council Resolution 1973, passed in response to widely-reported concerns over the possibility of a massacre in Benghazi, provided NATO with the limited authority to establish a no-fly zone and to intervene in order to protect civilians. Participating NATO members, led by the UK and France, in almost no time exceeded the resolution’s provisions by arming rebel groups, inserting special forces and advisors, and mounting a protracted, and at times intense air campaign in service of regime change. This level of engagement has gone well beyond anything provided for in the resolution, and, however much one might admire the goals, amounts essentially to vigilante action.

What is to be made of this kind of example? It certainly lies outside the more limited precepts of humanitarian intervention, and as such does not qualify under the Responsibility to Protect doctrine. Indeed, it is hard to avoid the thought that oil and opportunity played a defining role in determining the nature of the course taken. These actions also suggest the continued functioning of a world order in which the “rule makers” are free to act as they please, while the “rule takers” have no such option. Anyone with an interest in just global governance cannot be thrilled about this sort of demonstration, which has all of the hallmarks of imperial over-reach.

Talking vs. fighting. In Guerrilla Diplomacy, I spend about 300 pages making the case that if development has become the new security in the age of globalization, then diplomacy must replace defence at the centre of international policy. In that regard, the question must be put: why did western powers once again reach first for the gun? Why did they not consult with their own citizens before acting? Where was the diplomatic offensive? Yes, the foreign holdings of the Gadhafi  family were frozen, an arms embargo was applied, and the International Criminal Court was asked to investigate legal proceedings. But this does not constitute anything like the full-court diplomatic press which was purported to be underway. There were no comprehensive economic or political sanctions, no dispatching of special envoys, no demands that the UN Security Council move to separate the combatants before the onset of full-blown hostilities. Hugo Chavez, and later the government of South Africa under African Union auspices  called for negotiations, offering mediation and good offices. Their entreaties were ignored.

While the full extent of the civilian and combatant casualties remains unknown, these have certainly been greater than might have been expected had pacific alternatives to the use of force been fully explored. It is by no means inconceivable that a similar outcome could have been achieved without recourse to protracted violence. Another opportunity for the vigorous exercise of diplomacy has been forsaken, and that seems to me most unfortunate.

International policy coherence. It can be argued that because of the constantly shifting balance between values and interests, consistency has never been one of the defining features of international policy. That said, what we are witnessing in this case represents an exceptional, if not unprecedented, case of incoherence. Well after the end of the Cold War, close Western allies have included a selection of corrupt, unrepresentative, illiberal, and often very nasty autocrats. Their friendship was often actively courted in the name of geopolitical stability, resource access or commercial gain. Today, some, but by no means all of those same figures have become the subject of scorn, derision, and ridicule. There is no obvious pattern. And in places where government forces actually have been slaughtering their own people – in Syria, Bahrain, Yemen and elsewhere – next to nothing is done.

As unrepresentative despots go, Gadhafi was no worse than many, and his track record in terms of personal corruption and spending on infrastructure, education and social services was actually better than average. It is useful to recall that not long ago, western leaders – keen to expand trade and acquire newly available oil concessions – were lining up to see him. His decisions to dismantle Libya’s nuclear and WMD programs, to stop supporting international terrorism, to turn over suspects and offer a financial settlement for the Lockerbie bombing, and to denounce al-Qaida had the effect of transforming his status from that of a pariah to something akin to a newfound friend. Fast forward a few years and that rapprochement suddenly became history, with Gadhafi  again characterized as a dangerous buffoon, an obstacle to democracy, and an enemy of the people.

Little wonder that those with a preference for religious extremism and political violence find the contradictions inherent in western policy such an easy propaganda target.

Break it and it’s yours. No one seems to know very much about the ruling National Transitional Council or their future intentions for the country. My impression is that the concerns expressed over a possible Islamist tendency in the uprising have been over-drawn. Still, NATO played a significant part in achieving the present outcome, and with that should come an equal measure of responsibility.

The challenges ahead are great, and they go well beyond finding and trying the former president. Long before elections can be contemplated, the remaining pockets of resistance will have to be quelled, reprisals avoided, tribal and clan differences broached, militias disarmed, weapons brought under the state control, services restored and critical infrastructure repaired. That is a daunting list.

NATO countries missed out on providing meaningful political support to the Arab Spring, and in this case chose instead to participate militarily. The consequences of that decision will endure.

I wish the new Libyan government well, but nevertheless wonder if similar results could have been achieved without recourse to violence or foreign intervention.

A few weeks ago in Oslo, Norway, in the company of about 40 other invitees from around the world, I attended an OECD “experts” meeting, sponsored by the Norwegian and German Ministries of Education and Research, on the subject of Science, Technology, Innovation and Global Challenges.

The workshop was predicated upon the shared realization that if  international policy and decision-makers cannot be convinced that a radical course correction is needed, then in the not too distant future the planet may reach a tipping point. Beyond that point, recovery will be difficult, if not impossible.

Think climate change, diminishing biodiversity, food insecurity, resource scarcity, pandemic disease, and so forth.

So… we were talking about the principal threats imperilling life on the planet.

Not your standard bit of bureaucratic process.

Today, I am en route to Otago University in Dunedin, New Zealand, to speak at a conference entitled Science Diplomacy: New Day or False Dawn. Among many other speakers are Murray McCully, the Foreign Minister of New Zealand, Vaughn Turekian, head of  the science diplomacy unit at the American Academy for the Advancement of Science, and Dr. Jeffery Boutwell, from Pugwash USA.

Two global gatherings in two months on science, technology, diplomacy and international policy. Is it possible that something’s happening here, even if what is ain’t exactly clear?

Maybe.  I certainly hope so.

Here’s why – let me try and connect the dots.

Guerrilla Diplomacy’s central argument, in its most highly distilled form, is  that if development has in large part become the new security in the age of globalization, then diplomacy must displace defence at the centre of international policy.

In this formulation, diplomacy, which is all about privileging talking over fighting and using non-violent political communication rather than armed force to resolve international disputes, would be placed front and centre in international relations.

Traditional diplomacy involves the representatives of states transacting the business of government among and between themselves. By way of contrast, public diplomacy (PD) involves the use of dialogue, advocacy and other public relations tools by envoys engaging directly with foreign publics in order to influence their governments. PD has become a critical component of statecraft – not just in industrialized countries – and it looms large in the current literature on diplomatic studies.

Science diplomacy (SD) is a crucial, if under-utilized, component within the PD constellation, and it represents a significant source of soft power, that potent form of influence which is based on attraction and harnesses national influence, reputation, and brand. Science diplomacy is significant not only in its capacity to address many of the earth’s most urgent challenges, but also because it is an effective emissary of  important values such as evidence-based learning, openness and sharing.

The use of science to advance diplomatic ends is distinct from international scientific cooperation by virtue of its connection to government interests and objectives. Cooperation in the enterprise of international science is typically a win-win proposition, for instance by pulling together to find ways to produce clean water, improve hygiene or develop disease resistant crops. Science diplomacy might produce similar outcomes, but the results could just as easily be asymmetrical, particularly if there are negotiations involved. Arms control and non-proliferation talks during the Cold War, and a whole constellation of international scientific programs and exchanges undertaken during the second half of the last century come  immediately to mind.

Not all science diplomacy, it must be stressed, is devoted to the achievement of pacific ends. Covert collaboration involving, variously, Pakistan, Iran, China, North Korea and Libya on nuclear explosive and missile propulsion technologies is an illustrative case in point.

But… back to basics, to the idea of science itself. In a contested and competitive world of voodoo economics, bundled derivatives, radical politics and religious extremism, science proceeds from the assumption that misery is not fated: because all events are caused, all problems – eventually – can be solved.

At its best, science might be seen to represent the closest thing we have to universality, perhaps even truth.  In the roiling realm of international relations, science diplomacy  merits considerably more attention than it has recently been accorded.

It may be that the conference in Dunedin, like the meeting in Oslo, will break new ground.

I hope so.

There is much to be done and the clock is ticking.

Fast.

In a posting penned a couple of weeks ago, I expressed serious reservations  over the growing prospect of a Western military intervention in Libya. A political and diplomatic resolution would have been far preferable.  It remains a mystery in Western capitals how the unenthusiastic consideration of a no-fly-zone somehow morphed, with minimal public or political debate, into to an ambitious and ever-widening program of ground attacks.  Now, suddenly, the dogs of war have been let slip, and the actions of yet another  “coalition” are in full swing.

The Chinese, Russians and Germans, among others, have already stated their misgivings, and both Brazil and India abstained from the sweeping UN resolution which authorized the air campaign. While conflict outcomes  and their implications are inherently difficult to assess or predict, there are a number of factors in place which suggest that this episode may not end well.

Consider the following:

• This cannot, in the first instance, be considered a humanitarian intervention as set out under the Responsibility to Protect doctrine. The explicit goal here is regime change, which means that Western countries have essentially chosen sides in a regional and tribally-based civil war – a highly fraught course, as  experience in Afghanistan and Iraq makes clear;

• Passage of Resolution 1973 notwithstanding, the UN Security Council is not broadly representative of world power or opinion; its authority arguably outweighs its legitimacy – significantly, no Arab countries have yet joined in the bombing, the  African Union is not supporting the intervention, and the Arab League, while initially on side,  has since voiced concerns. The debilitating optics, and catastrophic consequences of Western warplanes again attacking an Islamic country and killing Muslims will almost certainly erode whatever support remains;

• The citizenry in participating Western countries were not asked if they supported a more robust form of intervention that had been initially mooted. Support for the present course is likely thin, and will become more so if the duration of the violence is protracted and non-combatant casualties mount;

• Diplomatic alternatives to the use of armed force were not exhausted earlier in the process, and there is no obvious post-war plan;  today, there appears little room for any kind of negotiated settlement or face saving way out. The lack of a dignified exit strategy could blow back, and encourage Qaddafi hang on;

• Qaddafi ‘s regime, however unpalatable, is not obviously more authoritarian or less representative than those in Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Oman or Yemen, all of which still enjoy Western backing. Although no one will defend his appalling performance on human rights or corruption, the Colonel`s record of investing more than most in schools, hospitals, housing and infrastructure, together with coalition duplicity, suggests a degree of policy incoherence which can only become more obvious over time.

And then, of course, there are the notorious what ifs… What if the US decides that leading three wars simultaneously is too much, tries to hand off to NATO, and some members, including key players such as Turkey and Germany, balk? What if the campaign goes on and on, and nothing changes?  What if Egypt intervenes to break the stalemate or to protect the remaining rebel strongholds of Benghazi and Tobruk, effectively partitioning the country?

These are early days. If the intervention does not drag on, produces limited collateral damage, averts a slaughter,  and results in the formation of a popular, unified new government then it may yet prove justified. Taken in combination, however, the observations set out above are troubling, and underscore once again the inescapable problems associated with a reliance upon military force as the international policy instrument of choice.