South of the border, there have in recent years been a growing number of voices expressing serious concern over the militarization of American life.

I certainly share that sentiment.

Is an F-16 fly over and trooping the colours  really appropriate for the opening of the Super Bowl?

The USA is apparently becoming the Praetorian pole in an increasingly  heterpolar world order. Still, I think that a debate of this nature is culturally healthy, and have always admired the fact that some of the most trenchant, even withering criticism of U.S. policy and actions comes from domestic sources, including not least that country’s many military academies and war colleges.

Even in the mainstream media, a decade’s worth of assumptions used to justify deploying the military to pursue the epically misguided global war on terror are finally being questioned.

One could only wish that a similar degree of the scrutiny accorded defence issues in the USA  might one day be evident in the discourse on international policyin Canada.

Apart from a few faint echoes in the academy and a handful of specialized publications, that discussion here  is practically non-existent. I find that most unfortunate.

Canadians need to start talking about the kind of military that they require in the face of all identifiable threats and challenges. They must then somehow try and square the outcome of that conversation against a thoughtful consideration of whether or not the defence capability that they need matches the one that they have got.

I have my doubts.

* * * * * * * * * *

Post-Afghanistan, the Canadian forces are fully kitted up. Main battle tanks and artillery. Light armoured vehicles and troop transports. Heavy air lift. New fighter aircraft are next.  By international standards, they may be small, but they are sharp. After a period of rest, they will again be ready for combat.

But here’s the rub. Garrisoning our borders will not stop infectious disease. We won’t find alternatives to the carbon economy by sending out an expeditionary force to capture them. Generals and admirals won’t be able to save us from a warming planet or changing climate.

That said, and to be sure, in the firmament of international policy there is a place for hard power instruments, and I am certainly not an unequivocal pacifist. Having a capable military gets you a place at the table at NATO headquarters in Brussels, and the ear of some influential people in Washington.  And  not just hawks and neo-conservatives.

But is that enough?

Militaries exist, in the first instance, for capturing or killing enemies, and for compelling your adversary to submit to your will. This is what armed forces  were designed to achieve and why they are lethally equipped.

It seems unlikely, for example, that any kind of diplomatic intercession could have stopped Hitler and the Nazis. The problem is that, early in the 21^st century there is no threat out there that looks remotely like the Third Reich, or even Imperial Japan. In the nuclear age, moreover, large scale conventional war has become inconceivable.

In fact, the enduring lesson of the Cold War is that militaries work best when they are not used. Take the blade out of its sheath for purposes of doing harm, and it tends to make a terrible mess, as can be witnessed today in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Libya seems set to become the next case in point.

The problem with leading with the sword is that you run the very real risk of allowing policy to become an instrument of war, rather than vice versa.

* * * * * * * * * *

Today, militaries are being deployed as first responders in complex emergencies, such as natural disasters in fragile or failed states. In such cases, the questions must be put: how, when, and with what should a nation intervene? Given the elemental purpose of the armed forces, in humanitarian intercessions are they really the most appropriate international policy instrument, or do they just get the tasking because they have the nominal capacity while the other instruments have been allowed to wither for lack of resources? When resources are scarce, does this represent a misallocation?

Crucially, could not purpose-built civilian organizations do a better, more cost-effective  job?

A decade ago, recruitment advertisements for the Canadian Forces had the memorable refrain. “There’s no life like it”. Soldiers were being shown keeping the peace.

Today, the slogan is “Fight” and soldiers are shown going to war.

If security is the flip side of development, does this re-alignment make sense?

None of this came up in the recent federal election campaign, which is unfortunate.

It is time to begin an overdue national conversation on where to go with defence policy, international security and the Canadian military.

The following commentary, based in part on my “Ferment in North Africa” entry, was posted by the University of Southern California’s Public Diplomacy Blog 02 February:

This is one of those rare, defining moments in world history. In Egypt – as well as Tunisia, Sudan, Yemen and elsewhere – change is unfolding at almost blinding speed. The reactions of the USA, EU, and UN  so far have succeeded mainly in positioning the international community well behind the curve, scrambling to catch up. Developments on the ground continue to outpace responses by a wide margin.

In Washington, Brussels, Paris, and London, the deepening crisis, with Cairo at its epicentre,  underscores the difficulties inherent in trying to balance values – democracy, human rights, good governance, the rule of law – and interests, and in expressing that balance through the articulation of coherent international policy. When autocratic regimes have been supported for decades, and even when the status quo becomes obviously untenable, it is difficult to know how best to react.

Stand-off in Tunis.

Riots in Khartoum

Cairo burning.

In the erstwhile global village, which today looks more like an island patchwork of  heavily guarded, gated communities surrounded by an angry sea of seething shantytowns, the relentless forces of globalization continue to transform world politics. Cairo is the current, and increasingly turbulent epicentre, but many countries in the region are susceptible to similar rebellions.

In Egypt, Tunisia, Sudan and elsewhere, change is unfolding very rapidly. The reactions of the USA, EU, UN, and certainly Canada have positioned the international community well behind the curve. Developments on the ground have outpaced responses by a wide margin, and an anti-Western backlash, which could carry major economic and political implications, cannot be ruled out.

What, then, are the the broad strategic considerations which decision-makers could usefully take into account?

Several of the principal arguments advanced in Guerrilla Diplomacy may offer insights useful in interpreting the larger meaning and impact of these breaking events. The following thematic survey is offered to that end.

Globalization has become a driver of instability and a major contributor to insurrection.

As the defining historical process of our times, globalization generates wealth and creates opportunities, but not for all. The benefits tend to be uneven, which can result in increasing inequity and polarization within and between states. A few beneficiaries are squeezed upwards, while those less fortunate are forced down. Some win, more lose, and few are left untouched. Under certain circumstances, such as rising unemployment or food and fuel price increases, this volatile combination can trigger the collective release of anger and disaffection, often expressed through revolt. That dynamic, destabilizing response to globalization is one of the major forces animating today’s news.

Science and technology is a two-edged sword which cuts all ways.

In previous postings I have noted that even as science and technology (S&T) provide solutions to some of the world’s most difficult problems, they can also generate new ones. This has been illustrated clearly in the case with the WikiLeaks revelations. In North Africa, technology has until now allowed for ever more efficient repression, but today is fuelling and abetting resistance. Negative perceptions have been exacerbated and protest planning facilitated by widespread and relatively inexpensive access to information and communications technologies, such as cell phones and the internet. Twitter, Facebook, and YouTube, for example, are said to have figured centrally in the Tunisian uprising; efforts by the Mubarak regime to forestall similar developments in Egypt by shutting down network access have not been entirely successful. In the age of globalization, S&T makes possible the formation of virtual communities almost instantly and represents a critical new variable.

Underdevelopment breeds insecurity.

Development is a somewhat amorphous concept, but it occurs where individuals are able to attain some semblance of their full economic, social and political potential without undue or unjust constraint. From development flows security, which flourishes when people are able to meet their basic needs in the absence of want and fear. Security and development, therefore, are joined at the hip, two sides of the same coin. In North Africa, however, growing income disparities, an expanding youth demographic, and skyrocketing unemployment have conspired to ensure that neither are much in evidence. This combination of underdevelopment and insecurity, as we are witnessing,  can be explosive.

Religious fanaticism and political violence are symptomatic mainly of deeper problems

To date, most of the action in the streets has been non-violent in nature and secular in orientation. Given the chance, and particularly if strides are made towards democracy, good governance, respect for human rights and the rule of law, it is my experience that most people would rather pursue economic and educational opportunities than resort to jihad or seek violent retribution. But if already pronounced conditions of exploitation and injustice are ignored or exacerbated, then desperation may grow, especially if disorder spreads and shortages become epidemic. Should real reform be thwarted or material circumstances worsen, everything could change, with those offering extreme solutions moving into fill the void.

Western military power is largely irrelevant

In many underdeveloped countries, the bureaucracy is reviled and the military is respected, if not revered as one of the few national institutions that functions. In the industrialized world, however, although the civilian agencies of government work passably well, what really sets the armed forces apart from other international policy instruments is their receipt of the lion’s share of available resources. Given that bombs and guns can’t be used to address the variety of real threats and challenges facing the planet – climate change, pandemic disease, poverty, environmental collapse – this represents a serious misallocation. We seem to have forgotten the main lesson that should have been learned from the Cold War, namely that armies work best when they aren’t used.  Similarly, today in the southern Mediterranean, sending in the marines, blockading the ports or calling in an air strike will not encourage the desired outcomes. Besides being costly to maintain, hard power is of very limited utility in a heteropolar world.  Nuanced understanding and effective civil assistance are more likely to produce laudable results.

Diplomacy could make a difference

In Washington, Brussels, Paris, London and elsewhere, the current crisis underscores the difficulties  inherent in trying to balance values and interests, and in expressing that balance through the articulation of coherent international policy. When autocratic regimes have been supported for decades, and even when the status quo becomes obviously untenable, it is difficult to know how best to respond. This is precisely where engaging the negotiating, knowledge-based  problem solving, and complex balancing capacities of diplomacy should be invaluable. Conventional, state-to state representational mechanisms can be used to help ease former friends from office and into exile. Public diplomacy may be used to support peace and progress, and to communicate the views of concerned governments directly to foreign populations. Guerrilla diplomacy is ideally suited, among other things, to the cultivation of ties with the emerging resistance leaders, and to generating intelligence at the grass roots level. Unfortunately, guerrilla diplomacy remains next to non-existent, and foreign ministries most everywhere, under-funded and struggling to adapt, are ill-equipped to perform.

Looking ahead? A demonstration effect is roiling the region, and more extensive turmoil can be anticipated.  The events unfolding in Tunis, Cairo, and Khartoum illustrate that in the age of globalization, governments need desperately to find a better way to deliver international policy. In that respect, a focus on diplomacy and development could be used to address the root causes of insecurity, and in a way that works without the manifold costs associated with the threat or use of armed force.

Security, after all, is not a martial art.

I would attribute the running down of diplomacy in recent years to a trio of developments related to the carry-over from the Cold War of certain habits of mind, or intellectual baggage, which have been hoisted into the globalization age from the preceding era. In a nutshell, in the face of the complex threats and challenges engendered by globalization, and the concomitant need for deep knowledge, nuanced understanding and a subtle approach, many continued to view the world in a way best described as Manichean, alarmist and militaristic.

Without getting into the full details of the argument, or assessing the important implications for recruiting, training and diplomatic practice, this must be unpacked a bit. During the Cold War, the West organized its international policy around the objective of ‘containment’, by deterring, blocking, and wherever possible, rolling back what was seen as a world-wide Communist threat. Think Harry Truman, George Keenan NSC 68 and Mutually Assured Destruction. From 1947 to 1991, the adversary was portrayed as a monolithic Red Menace – Russians, Chinese, North Koreans, North Vietnamese, Cubans, Nicaraguans… No matter. Those Commies were all the same.

For a decade after the walls came down, there were few credible threats available to be conjured, but this changed instantly post 9/11 when a very similar, open-ended impulse – and function – again found expression. The Global War on Terror filled the ideological void once occupied by the Cold War. Al Qaeda, Taliban, Hamas, Hezbollah – no matter. All Islamic extremists were alike. Substitute terrorism for communism, recycle a familiar ideological construct, et voila - away they went. Again. No secretive conspiracy here, just consensus among members of certain influential groups who identified an opportunity to advance their agenda.

The principal elements of this Cold War carry-over include:

• the adoption of a binary world view, which reduces almost infinite complexity to a matter of “us versus them; you are with us, or with the terrorists”;

• the use of fear to galvanize domestic support by characterizing the threat as urgent and universal “they are not only out there, everywhere, but they are among us and could strike anywhere, anytime. Red alert. “, and;

• a preference for armed force in responding to perceived threats, and the favouring of defence over diplomacy or development in what might be reasonably described as the militarization of international policy.

Taken together, these elements constitute a persistent, and troublingly resilient line, one endlessly hyped in the media and deeply lodged in the public mind.

What is wrong with this picture? In my view, getting over this debilitating mindset, even more so than taking full account of science and technology as a driver of international policy and transforming diplomacy, will be the sine qua non for the success of any diplomatic renaissance. Diplomats can become entrepreneurial brokers and network nodes, building relationships and supporting civil society actors in efforts to advance democratic development, good governance and the management of political and social plurality. But this won’t be possible unless the model, the context and the motives are changed. It is not yet clear that all of these pre-conditions are in place.

In particular, and in response to the burden of left luggage:

The world is not black and white but a many layered and multi-stranded swirl of greys.

Fear motivates the construction of gated communities within a national security state; hope is a far superior starting point for policy formulation.

Compulsion has its place in international relations, but attraction is more widely applicable, generally more effective and much less costly.

The fact of this psychological transfer of Cold War perceptions into the globalization age has meant not only that the peace dividend remains unpaid, but that for the past two decades the scope for applying non-violent approaches, such as diplomacy, to the resolution of international differences has been very limited. Iraq and Afghanistan are the obvious examples, but there are many more ranging from Darfur and the Democratic Congo to Israel/Palestine and India/Pakistan/Kashmir.

The planet has paid a high price for this hiatus. Notwithstanding that diplomacy, often in combination with development, offers the key to sustainable security, both have in recent years been in large part displaced by defence. By any measure – resource allocation, domestic political influence, even academic interest – diplomacy, the foreign ministry and the priority of equitable, sustainable and human-centred development have been on the back burner. Not so the legions, although an over-reliance on the state’s instruments of violence has imposed a whole host of other costs.

The economic and market meltdowns have spurred a realization of the need for innovative thinking in coping with the uncertainties of globalization. They have also given rise to a sense that some of the tools so hurriedly stashed when the train left the Cold War station may be worth dusting off, public diplomacy (PD) perhaps foremost among them. Not only are the large scale international scientific, educational, and cultural exchanges of days gone by now sorely missed, but AIDs cannot be detained; the climate cannot be garrisoned; the environment cannot be extraordinarily rendered; hunger cannot be bombed out of existence.

For these reasons and more, the ball is finally coming back, at long last, to practitioners of the world’s second oldest profession. By linking development and security through the medium of international policy, diplomacy, and especially public diplomacy, is poised again to occupy a place front and centre in international relations. Diplomats are advantageously placed to provide the essential strategic advice required by governments to integrate values, policies and interests right across the international policy spectrum. Neither members of the military, nor aid workers, NGO reps nor journalists can provide the sorts of supple intelligence required. They lack the tools of engagement, the cross-cultural skill set, and the capacity to generate the detailed, place-specific knowledge which might permit them to substitute in this critical role.