From May 18-20^th in Oslo, Norway, along with participants from some 40 countries and organizations around the world, I attended an “experts workshop” on Science, Technology and Innovation to Address Global Challenges. The meeting was organized jointly under OECD auspices by the Norwegian and German Ministries of Education and Research

The agenda included presentations and discussions on issues such as priority setting, funding, capacity building, and…

Asleep yet?

Well, this is your wake up call.

The Oslo meeting was far from a garden variety bureaucratic encounter. The rubber really hit the road during the final substantive session, which was innocuously entitled “Delivering Benefits.” At that point in the proceedings a consensus began to develop around a single, somewhat terrifying realization: If  international policy and decision-makers cannot be convinced that a radical course correction is needed, then in the not too distant future the world may reach a tipping point beyond which recovery will be difficult, if not impossible.

The consequences could well be catastrophic.

To understand how a group assembled by such a respectable institution as the OECD could reach such a disturbing conclusion, some sense of the over-arching analytical narrative is required. My  interpretation of the fundamental line of argument goes something like this.

In the globalization era, the most profound challenges to human survival — climate change, public health, diminishing biodiversity, and resource scarcity, to name a few — are rooted in science and driven by technology. Moreover, underdevelopment and insecurity, far more than religious extremism or political violence, represent fundamental threats to world order. In this context, the capacity to generate, absorb and use science and technology (S&T) could play a crucial role in improving security and development prospects. Addressing the needs of the poor, and bridging the digital divide could similarly become a pre-occupation of diplomacy.

Although poverty reduction contributes to development, and development is the flip side of security, S&T issues are largely alien to, and almost invisible within most international policy institutions. National governments, foreign ministries, development agencies, and indeed most multilateral organizations are without the scientific expertise, technological savvy, cultural pre-disposition or research and development (R&D) network access required to manage effectively. If this is to change, and in order to examine the remedial possibilities, politicians, opinion leaders and senior officials must be critically aware of both the dynamic inter-relationships among principal actors and the key questions and issues at play.

Unfortunately, their preoccupations lie almost entirely elsewhere.

The lion’s share of international policy resources are at present devoted to the military, which according to the rationale outlined above represents a colossal, and extremely costly misallocation. With a dominant international policy focus in many industrialized countries on counter-terrorism and the struggle against religious extremism and political violence, the threats and challenges which most imperil the planet remain largely unaddressed.

All told, this tale amounts to one terribly disturbing disconnect.

Because not only are the dots not joined-up.

In  most cases, there are no dots.

Whatever comes out of the Oslo meeting, it clearly will not, in itself, be enough to save the world. But if the project contributes to a more acute and widely-shared awareness of the real threat set, then we may all emerge at least with something in rather short supply under the present circumstances.

Hope.

South of the border, there have in recent years been a growing number of voices expressing serious concern over the militarization of American life.

I certainly share that sentiment.

Is an F-16 fly over and trooping the colours  really appropriate for the opening of the Super Bowl?

The USA is apparently becoming the Praetorian pole in an increasingly  heterpolar world order. Still, I think that a debate of this nature is culturally healthy, and have always admired the fact that some of the most trenchant, even withering criticism of U.S. policy and actions comes from domestic sources, including not least that country’s many military academies and war colleges.

Even in the mainstream media, a decade’s worth of assumptions used to justify deploying the military to pursue the epically misguided global war on terror are finally being questioned.

One could only wish that a similar degree of the scrutiny accorded defence issues in the USA  might one day be evident in the discourse on international policyin Canada.

Apart from a few faint echoes in the academy and a handful of specialized publications, that discussion here  is practically non-existent. I find that most unfortunate.

Canadians need to start talking about the kind of military that they require in the face of all identifiable threats and challenges. They must then somehow try and square the outcome of that conversation against a thoughtful consideration of whether or not the defence capability that they need matches the one that they have got.

I have my doubts.

* * * * * * * * * *

Post-Afghanistan, the Canadian forces are fully kitted up. Main battle tanks and artillery. Light armoured vehicles and troop transports. Heavy air lift. New fighter aircraft are next.  By international standards, they may be small, but they are sharp. After a period of rest, they will again be ready for combat.

But here’s the rub. Garrisoning our borders will not stop infectious disease. We won’t find alternatives to the carbon economy by sending out an expeditionary force to capture them. Generals and admirals won’t be able to save us from a warming planet or changing climate.

That said, and to be sure, in the firmament of international policy there is a place for hard power instruments, and I am certainly not an unequivocal pacifist. Having a capable military gets you a place at the table at NATO headquarters in Brussels, and the ear of some influential people in Washington.  And  not just hawks and neo-conservatives.

But is that enough?

Militaries exist, in the first instance, for capturing or killing enemies, and for compelling your adversary to submit to your will. This is what armed forces  were designed to achieve and why they are lethally equipped.

It seems unlikely, for example, that any kind of diplomatic intercession could have stopped Hitler and the Nazis. The problem is that, early in the 21^st century there is no threat out there that looks remotely like the Third Reich, or even Imperial Japan. In the nuclear age, moreover, large scale conventional war has become inconceivable.

In fact, the enduring lesson of the Cold War is that militaries work best when they are not used. Take the blade out of its sheath for purposes of doing harm, and it tends to make a terrible mess, as can be witnessed today in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Libya seems set to become the next case in point.

The problem with leading with the sword is that you run the very real risk of allowing policy to become an instrument of war, rather than vice versa.

* * * * * * * * * *

Today, militaries are being deployed as first responders in complex emergencies, such as natural disasters in fragile or failed states. In such cases, the questions must be put: how, when, and with what should a nation intervene? Given the elemental purpose of the armed forces, in humanitarian intercessions are they really the most appropriate international policy instrument, or do they just get the tasking because they have the nominal capacity while the other instruments have been allowed to wither for lack of resources? When resources are scarce, does this represent a misallocation?

Crucially, could not purpose-built civilian organizations do a better, more cost-effective  job?

A decade ago, recruitment advertisements for the Canadian Forces had the memorable refrain. “There’s no life like it”. Soldiers were being shown keeping the peace.

Today, the slogan is “Fight” and soldiers are shown going to war.

If security is the flip side of development, does this re-alignment make sense?

None of this came up in the recent federal election campaign, which is unfortunate.

It is time to begin an overdue national conversation on where to go with defence policy, international security and the Canadian military.

“Libya is engaged in a civil war. New protests have broken out in Oman, Bahrain and Yemen. The uprising in Tunisia, the pioneer state of the so-called “Arab Spring,” is entering a second phase. As usual, the amateurish Obama administration has no idea what to do about any of this.

…America has established that its national policy in Libya is regime change. The question now is whether our inexperienced president will take concerted steps to back up that policy.

Gadhafi’s son, Saif al-Islam, boasted that the regime in Tripoli is not fazed by the prospect of U.S. intervention. “We are ready, we are not afraid,” he said Tuesday. “We live here, we die here.” Maybe that can be arranged.”

Editorial, Washington Times, 01 March 2011

Slowly but surely, the sound of sabres rattling is growing louder. Amidst a looming humanitarian crisis and incipient civil war, and denials notwithstanding, there are tell-tale signs of the ground being prepared. In the US and UK there is talk of establishing a no-fly zone, of sending in special forces, of arming and training the rebels…

As Western military assets are deployed to the Eastern Mediterranean and politicians are speaking increasingly of the possibility of some sort of  intervention, my sense of dread intensifies.

Where is the diplomatic offensive? Yes, the foreign holdings of the Qaddafi  family have been frozen, an arms embargo applied, and legal proceedings are being investigated by the International Criminal Court.  But this does not constitute anything like the full court diplomatic press purported to be underway. In fact, it reveals diplomacy’s displacement. Why is no one other than Hugo Chavez calling for immediate negotiations, offering mediation and good offices, dispatching special envoys, demanding that the UN Security Council act to separate the combatants before the onset of full blown hostilities…?

Have we not seen this movie – the one with the tragic ending – before?

Do governments ever learn?

* * * * * * * * * *

Muammar Qaddafi has undoubtedly  many faults, and in recent interviews he appears completely out of touch and at least partially unhinged. In face of the eruptions of popular unrest currently washing over the Greater Middle East region, it is not in the least surprising that Qaddafi’s position is threatened, and perhaps lost.

The fact that the Colonel so richly deserves to go makes it all the more import to recall that not long ago Western leaders, keen to expand trade and acquire newly available oil concessions, were lining up to see him. His decision to turn over suspects and offer a financial settlement for the Lockerbie bombing, dismantle Libya’s nuclear program, denounce al-Qaeda and stop supporting international terrorism had the effect of transforming his status from that of pariah to something approaching a new-found friend, a figure emblematic of burgeoning business opportunities in emerging markets.

Now, that rapprochement is history, and Qaddafi  is again characterized as a dangerous buffoon, an obstacle to democracy, and an enemy of the people.

* * * * * * * * * *

It is all quite dizzying. Excruciating, even.

Consistency has never been one of the hallmarks of international policy, but what we are witnessing now represents an exceptional, if not unprecedented case of incoherence. For decades, corrupt, unrepresentative, illiberal and often very nasty despots and autocrats and were recognized as allies, and often actively courted in the name of stability and commerce. Today, some of those same figures have become the subject of scorn, derision and ridicule.

It is little wonder that those with a preference for religious extremism and political violence find the contradictions inherent in Western policy such an easy propaganda target.

* * * * * * * * * *

Duplicity is distasteful, but more serious problems persist.  Massive arms spending, a reliance upon the military as the international policy instrument of choice, and the imposition of coercive solutions to disputes worldwide remain the norm in Western political culture. The continuing priority accorded the Global War on Terror, though little in evidence at present, is the foremost example of this flawed prescription. Despite abject failures in recent years, government messaging and the mainstream media continue to portray military action as both morally justified and strategically essential. Policy has become an instrument of war, rather than the reverse. Fears have been conjured and insecurity instilled.

The effect has been to undercut support for alternative approaches to the management of world order.

In response to this widespread militarization of foreign policy, acute since 9/11, there exists an urgent, and unmet need to debate, interpret and engage international affairs and global issues through the lens of non-violent political communication. Events unfolding across the Greater Middle East underline the need to encourage long term, broadly based development and to resolve disputes through diplomacy. Power is shifting, and ways will have to be found to accommodate fundamental change without repeating the mistakes – which led to two world wars and a Cold War – of the last century.

Simply put, the military is both too sharp, and too dull and instrument to deal with the challenges of globalization, and governments today desperately need to find other channels through which to deliver international policy. Shooting their way to victory won’t work, and no amount of resources devoted to existing conceptions of “national security” can ever produce the outcomes required.

Guns will never get us there.

A well-honed capacity for genuine dialogue, supple analysis, knowledge-based problem-solving and complex balancing just might.

* * * * * * * * * *

Prior to the latest events in North Africa and the Middle East, if the diplomatic representatives of Western governments  had found their way closer to the grass roots and were more effectively networked, they would have been better  positioned to engage in guerrilla diplomacy. Were that to have been the case, what is going on today might not have come as such as surprise, and the under-performance now on display might not have been as severe. Among other things:

• Contacts in civil society, and especially among students and youth, would likely have provided ready conduits into newly established opposition groups;

• Intelligence would have been better;

• International policy responses could have been ahead of, rather than so far behind the curve.

Mainly, though, decision-makers would have access to a range of political alternatives to the provision of emergency humanitarian assistance in combination with the threat or use of hard power.  Negotiations would be front and centre rather than marginalized and sidelined.

Flailing about and falling back on the familiar combination of band-aids and bullets is certainly disheartening. But it will be a disaster if Libya – as with Iraq (shock and awe)  and Afghanistan (counterinsurgency) before it – becomes yet another testing ground for new thinking on defence policy and practice.

* * * * * * * * * *

The current crisis is growing, not ebbing, and it is showing every sign of a meltdown in the making. While the future cannot be foretold, as long as oil remains the lifeblood of industrial economies, the stakes will remain enormous.

Even with overwhelming military power, the arrival of the heterpolar age has made it impossible for any one country to control events in Libya – or anywhere else. Absent a collective commitment to diplomacy and development, governments will face grave difficulties pursuing their interests and achieving their objectives in the complex and turbulent world of the 21st century.

Because failure is not an option, a change in course is essential.

The following commentary, based in part on my “Ferment in North Africa” entry, was posted by the University of Southern California’s Public Diplomacy Blog 02 February:

This is one of those rare, defining moments in world history. In Egypt – as well as Tunisia, Sudan, Yemen and elsewhere – change is unfolding at almost blinding speed. The reactions of the USA, EU, and UN  so far have succeeded mainly in positioning the international community well behind the curve, scrambling to catch up. Developments on the ground continue to outpace responses by a wide margin.

In Washington, Brussels, Paris, and London, the deepening crisis, with Cairo at its epicentre,  underscores the difficulties inherent in trying to balance values – democracy, human rights, good governance, the rule of law – and interests, and in expressing that balance through the articulation of coherent international policy. When autocratic regimes have been supported for decades, and even when the status quo becomes obviously untenable, it is difficult to know how best to react.

Part I of this series examined the relationships – or lack thereof – between diplomacy, science and international policy, and noted the serious image problems which plague all three enterprises. These difficulties have hobbled the practice of science diplomacy, and are compounded by a host of substantial issues, which will be addressed presently. First, however, it may be useful to unpack the key terms.

Not unlike “intelligence” or  “policy”, “science” and “technology” are words frequently invoked in both conversation and writing. More often than not, however, the users have little more than an intuitive sense of what these terms actually mean.

Science and Development

An evidence-based and collegial form of  knowledge acquisition, science is founded upon empirical methods and the repeated verification of results. Neither inherently political nor ideological, it is a type of universal language, a vector of transnational communications which poses fundamental questions about the nature of things. Science is long term in orientation, bottom-up in origin, and collaborative by design. The findings of most scientific enquiry become part of the public realm. Most importantly, science and the reaearch which underpins it proceed from the assumption that all events are caused, and that all causes can – eventually – be determined.  That means that misery is not fated and that adversity can be rolled back through the creation of new knowledge – to prevent and cure disease, discover alternative energy sources, invent new materials, and so forth. At its best, science enlarges understanding and encourages development.

Science also plays an important role in the formation and conditioning of intellectual culture and national values. In its scope and methodology, science helps to inform current analysis and educate enquiring minds. The scientific ethos of objective experimentation through trial and error has broad appeal: it promotes merit (through peer review); openness (through publication); civic values and citizen empowerment (through the encouragement of respect for diverse perspectives). In short, science advances learning in a transparent, participatory and inclusive manner. It represents a cornerstone of humanity’s progress.

Technology and National Interests

Technology, on the other hand, is applied knowledge. Its relationship to science is not, as is widely believed, always linear, and it is deeply implicated in the defining historical process of our times, globalization. Because technology touches more directly and immediately upon government and private sector interests, its development is often top-down, short term, competitive and demand-driven. As the possession and use of technology can confer advantage, the latest technological innovations are often licensed, sold, used as bargaining chips, or otherwise protected as private goods.  As a tool in the hands of man, technology is related more closely than science to the possession and use of power, which is the capacity to achieve specified outcomes. Technology, therefore, tends to be regarded and used as an instrument of international policy.

It follows that science and technology per se should occupy a large, and very central place in diplomacy and international policy. The reality, however, is quite the opposite. Foreign ministries, development agencies, and indeed most multilateral organizations are without the scientific expertise, technological savvy, cultural pre-disposition or R&D network access and cross-cutting linkages required to engage with S&T, or to assess and manage S&T issues effectively.

Power, Profits, and International Policy

Even if diplomats and their institutions were better equipped, the perspectives and interests of those in the public sector, business, the NGO community and universities are not always complimentary. Often they are contradictory or competitive.

Consider, for instance:

• The preponderance of private sector control over essential S&T intellectual property (patents and copyrights limit spread of innovation and the transfer of technology)
• The influence of what President  Eisenhower described as the Military Industrial Complex over funding priorities and research agendas  (many governments are still spending more on defence  research than on health research)
• The militarization of international policy more generally (development and diplomacy have been sidelined by the use of armed force as the international policy instrument of choice)

These observations provide some idea of the scope and dimensions of the challenge. Yet the connections and trade-offs between defence spending and underdevelopment, S&T and international policy, or the public good and private interests are not on the radar screen of most analysts or governments.

If this is to change, and in order to examine the remedial possibilities, opinion leaders, decision-makers and senior officials must be critically aware of the dynamic inter-relationships among and between principal actors and the key questions and issues at play.

Unfortunately, most are not. In fact, these matters are seldom on the political map. The implications for both Canada and the world are significant, and these will be the subject of the next post.