In the previous post, I tried to show that during the 1980s and ‘90s the paradigm for the delivery of Canadian international policy shifted fundamentally. Over the course of those years, there was a deliberate move away from an emphasis on traditional, state-to-state interaction in the direction of public diplomacy (PD). This form of international political exchange features diplomats communicating directly with foreign populations and cultivating partnerships with civil society actors – NGOs, businesspeople, journalists and academics.  I also made the case that the PD formula, in conjunction with the right combination of political will and bureaucratic skill, can produce impressive results, especially if directed towards projects with broad popular and media appeal, such as a land mine ban or efforts to improve the lot of children in conflict zones.

Looking back, it can be seen that Canadian PD reached its apogee under Foreign Minister Axworthy (1996-2000). At a time of severe government-wide cost-cutting, Canada fundamentally down-sized its international ambitions, but that exercise was not translated into a retreat from the field. To be sure, the large scale, long range, potentially world changing projects of the post-war decades  – poverty eradication, conflict resolution, global environmental conservation – were gone. In their place, Canadian officials proposed a series of special projects – for example, curbs on the trading of “blood” diamonds and small arms – designed for implementation within media-friendly diplomatic niches. They did not always succeed, but each initiative featured a defined start and finish. Upon completion, the Minister could simply call a press conference, declare victory and move on.

Minister Axworthy learned, and very quickly, how the use of soft power could make a virtue of necessity. Conventional diplomacy was still necessary, but it was no longer sufficient when it came to influencing foreign governments. That influence was best brought to bear through their publics, and through international public opinion, especially when compulsion was not an option and democratization had expanded the scope for exercising influence indirectly.

The requirements associated with this burst of activism imposed significant costs upon DFAIT’s staff, already struggling under the burden of increased demands and reduced resources.  Moreover, some strategic opportunities were missed. In 1996-97, for instance, the department’s Communications Bureau proposed the launch of an ambitious project which would have vaulted Canada into the digital age by establishing an integrated global presence based upon satellite broadcasting, the internet, public diplomacy, international education and branding.  In the end, however, at a time of diminishing capacity across government, the Canadian International Information Strategy (CIIS) lost out in Cabinet to the campaign to ban land mines (later christened the “Ottawa Process”). Canada might today be more effective and influential in the world had circumstances – particularly timing and the economic environment – been more propitious during that critical period.

In bureaucracy, there is often a lag between action and reflection. The Axworthy years were so frenetic that there was little time to think through the full implications of his program in terms of the design, structure and operations of the foreign ministry. As a result, generic interest in PD within the DFAIT apparatus actually peaked following Axworthy’s departure. For the first five years of the new century, significant efforts were made weave PD into the department’s modus operandi. A new PD Secretariat was established in Washington to coordinate advocacy activities in the USA. The idea of  “mainstreaming public diplomacy” was central to a comprehensive reform package launched by DFAIT’s  Deputy Ministers in 2004 and entitled Building a 21^st Century Foreign Ministry, or FAC21. When Prime Minister Chretien stepped down the same year, the new leader, Paul Martin, commissioned a comprehensive international policy review. In the final, five volume report, A Place of Pride and Influence in the World, PD was highlighted as “the new diplomacy”.

Although it has been scarcely more than a decade since Axworthy left office, the years of Canadian public diplomatic activism now seem long ago and far away. Ironically, despite the many practical successes and, later, some focused internal interest, PD never received the extent of budgetary support which might have been anticipated. This is doubly curious because although Axworthy’s Liberal successors, John Manley, Bill Graham and Pierre Pettigrew, did not share his enthusiasm for human security, they did seem to buy into PD. Manley mandated a public diplomacy working group within the secretariat conducting his – albeit short-lived -  Foreign Policy Update in 2001, and beginning in 2003 Graham used the interactive potential of the internet to reach out to Canadians with his Foreign Policy Dialogue. But political interest in undertaking concrete diplomatic initiatives had waned well before the January, 2006 election of a Conservative minority government. Almost immediately, the previous administration’s policy review was shelved, government communications were centralized and placed under strict control, and DFAIT officials were gagged.

Canadian public diplomacy, already in decline and tainted lethally by its association with the outgoing Liberal government, effectively disappeared.

Memories of independent Canadian leadership on global issues are receding, the drift towards continental integration continues.

In May 2011 the Conservative party was returned with a majority, and John Baird, a prominent and influential Tory insider, was named Foreign Minister. The new minister speaks of the need for a “tough”  foreign policy, and the overall emphasis favours the military over diplomacy and development assistance. Yet there are stirrings within DFAIT of a possible PD renewal. A modest experiment has been launched allowing several of Canada’s European ambassadors to engage foreign audiences using social media platforms Twitter and Facebook, and this enterprise may eventually be expanded to include the participation of all Canadian missions.

That said, even under a best case scenario Canada will still be trailing most of its diplomatic competition, both within the OECD and beyond. Unless and until DFAIT regains the full confidence, trust and respect of its political masters, and is once again called upon to perform, any return to the halcyon days of Canadian PD activism seems unlikely.

From the late 1940s  through to early in this century, Canada enjoyed a reputation as a determined, capable and effective internationalist. Regardless of which party formed the government, this country actively engaged with other peoples and states in the in the pursuit of collaborative solutions to the world’s major problems and challenges. From the founding of the UN, post-war reconstruction and the Suez crisis to non-proliferation issues, protection of the global commons and working to address the plight of children in conflict, Canada was always present, and, when appropriate, ready to lead.

As Canada’s relative power and influence inevitably declined with the recovery of Europe and Asia and the emergence of China, India, Brazil and others, the scale of Canadian activism was down-sized.  Grand, long-term goals such as eradicating poverty and bringing peace to the world gradually gave way to to smaller, “niche”  projects such as the land mine ban, conflict diamonds and the construction of innovative new doctrines such as the Responsibility to Protect.  The nature of Canadian internationalism changed with the times, and public diplomacy was mobilized to advance the likes of Human Security Agenda, but a core commitment to internationalism endured.

Today, little remains of that tradition, and international policy decision-making seems related mainly to the quest for future electoral advantage.

What happened?

Changes in the nature and direction of domestic politics have certainly played a part. The Harper Conservatives have tended to conflate internationalism with the foreign policy of the Liberal party, which they have condemned, and not without some justification,  as soft, airy and empty – all talk, no action. The Conservatives  have repudiated the past and embraced a more hard power oriented and militarized approach to international affairs which features a demonstrated preference for fighting over talking. Adulation for the armed forces, and the celebration of all things martial have reached unprecedented heights.

While prepared to join – with minimal public discussion or debate – in aggressive counter-insurgency warfare in Afghanistan or the NATO bombing of Libya, it seems unlikely that this country will ever again undertake anything as ambitious as orchestrating the 1981 Cancun Summit on North-South issues or the 1992 Rio Conference on environment and development, not to mention the exercise of leadership within the Commonwealth to defeat apartheid in southern Africa. Instead, we negotiate trade agreements, promote asbestos exports and boycott major multilateral conferences on racism and disarmament. Canada has walked away from peacekeeping,  dispensed with a balanced approach towards conflict resolution in the Middle East, and received the Fossil of the Year award for our performance on climate change.

In other words, the once familiar helpful fixer, honest broker, provider of “good offices” and boy scout to the world is no more. Canada’s image, reputation and brand are being radically reconstructed. As underscored so painfully by last year’s failure to win an elected seat on the UN Security Council, the rest ot the world has finally taken notice.

Political and ideological changes, exacerbated by a revolving door pattern of ministerial appointments over the past decade,  provide part of the explanation.  Though often overlooked, the running down of this country’s diplomatic apparatus has also hurt. The Department of Foreign Affairs has had great difficulty adapting to the challenges of globalization and has not done well in competition with other departments – especially defence – when it comes to the annual resource auction.  Today the foreign ministry is sidelined, marginalized, and facing yet another round of deep cuts. Deprived of the financial support required and with its representatives effectively gagged, DFAIT’s capacity and influence have been deliberately reduced.

Unlike DFAIT, ministries such as Human Resources and Skills Development, Transport, Infrastructure, Heritage, Industry and many others have large domestic programs, send cheques to their clients, and create jobs. As a result, all enjoy supportive, and sometimes vocal national constituencies. Moreover, while the expansion – or encroachment – of other government departments into areas previously believed to be the exclusive preserve of the foreign ministry has been going on for years, there has been little compensatory effort to insert foreign ministry perspectives into domestic debates, or to underline the Department’s relevance to the national security and domestic prosperity.

Consigned now to the edges of government with few natural or permanent allies, the failure to invest in a  sustained and strategic effort to develop a durable base  has been costly for DFAIT.

The active nurturing of a supportive domestic environment for the formulation of international policy is critical – if messages are to be carried abroad, they must resonate at home. Yet at a time of maximum need, the foreign ministry’s outreach activities have been ratcheted back dramatically. Significant domestic interest in, and support for diplomacy, the foreign ministry and international policy is nowhere now in evidence.

Domestic politics and diminished bureaucratic capacity have both played a part in orchestrating Canada’s departure from its diplomatic past. None of this could have happened, however, if Canadians themselves had strenuously objected. Instead, both during and between elections, there has been barely a peep from the populace.

Those matters warrant further investigation, and will be the subject of a future post.

Looking back over decade since 9/11, what events and developments stand out globally? Among others:

• The ongoing Global War on Terror and associated Western military interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan.

• The hollowing out of the middle class, the financial crisis and the continuing Great Recession.

• The lost opportunities to support non-violent political reform during the Arab Spring.

9/11 changed everything, and the carnage and consequences engendered by that day haunt us still.

The Twin Towers episode was tragic, but not just on account of the mass fatalities. It provided the neoconservative ideologues in the Bush administration with the pretext they needed to seize control of the domestic and international agendas, and entrench the politics of fear. On their watch, human rights were systematically violated and torture legalized, while military and intelligence spending increased vastly. With this came not only Guantonamo Bay and Abu Ghraib; a network of “black” prisons and interrogation centres was established world-wide, and “extraordinary renditions” kept up the flow of detainees.  On the home front, taxes were cut, civil and constitutional rights were rolled back, and the national security and surveillance state constructed. Meanwhile, and as demonstrated indelibly during the failed response to Hurricane Katrina, the federal government’s program and service infrastructure was gutted.

For the USA, 9/11 was the trip wire which marked the beginning of the end of the unipolar moment. Its aftermath has bankrupted America’s economy, destroyed its reputation, squandered its global leadership, and ensured that the country remains the object of anger and resentment throughout the Arab and Islamic world.

Remarkably, some elements of this misguided response – the drone strikes, covert operations and targeted assassinations – have been ramped up under President Obama. Despite some new packaging, the past four years have seen more continuity than change in American policy.

For friends of the USA, that is worrisome.

Still reaching for the gun

Take, for instance, the Arab Spring. We have witnessed a convincing expression of the people’s thirst for reform. Moreover, that conviction has been expressed in an overwhelmingly secular manner, with the more extreme iterations of radical Islamism notable mainly for their absence. That observation, which not coincidentally relates directly back to the implications of 9/11, may represent the Arab Spring’s most enduring legacy. Either way, one would have thought that lending support to the forces of democratic progress, particularly in the face of concerns over violent Islamic extremism, would have been an obvious choice.

Instead, the West stood by as Tunisia and Egypt erupted, and chose to intervene militarily in the Libyan civil war. The result in most cases has been that beyond cosmetic changes in the top level leadership, very little of substance has really changed.  Labels notwithstanding, these uprisings are a far cry from revolution. And meanwhile, confronted by the stirrings in Jordan, revolts in Bahrain and Yemen, and a full scale rebellion in Syria, NATO’s response has been mute or incoherent.

There is a better way. In the age of globalization, development – long term, equitable, sustainable – has become the new basis for world security. At the level of grand strategy, that means that diplomacy must replace defence at the centre of international policy.

Until that lesson is taken to heart, the toll of 9/11 will continue to mount

True north in transition

How has 9/11 changed Canada? Profoundly, but – like so much else – in a manner mainly resembling a miniature replica of the USA..

Although the metamorphosis here began well before the change of government in 2006, the nature and orientation of contemporary Conservative foreign policy differs significantly from that of previous Liberal and Progressive Conservative  governments.

At the highest level of analysis, it could not be clearer that the overall international policy emphasis and mix associated with this country has shifted. Adulation of the military, and a general preference for the use of armed force has been placed front and centre, at the expense of both diplomacy and development assistance. Ten years ago the rallying cry for defence recruitment was “There’s no life like it”. Now, it’s “Fight”. Accordingly, there has been an acceleration in the transformation of the structure of the Canadian Forces, away from peacekeeping in favour of expeditionary war fighting. This redirection has been evident in both the prosecution of an ambitious – if ill-fated – counter-insurgency campaign in Kandahar, and in the enthusiastic participation in the NATO bombing and embargo in support of regime change in Libya.

At a speech in Trapani Italy delivered on September 1^st to members of the (Royal) Canadian Forces, Prime Minister Harper averred that “a handful of soldiers is better than a mouthful of arguments”. The following week in an interview he stated that “Islamicist” terrorism represents the foremost threat facing Canada.

So much for any kind of preference for nonviolent conflict resolution… not to mention according priority to the pressing need to address global issues such as climate change, diminishing biodiversity, nuclear proliferation, and environmental degradation. Unlike terrorism, any one of these threats could take down not just Canada, but large swathes of the world.

The Conservatives have emphasized Canada’s relations with the Americas – for the first four years at the expense of relations with China and India, which were ineptly managed. Free trade agreements have been pursued with a number of Latin American countries, while relations with African states have been marked by embassy closures and the concentration of aid expenditures on a more limited number of countries. A tilt towards the unconditional support for Israel has become the hallmark of Canadian policy on issues of Middle East politics and the regional peace process more broadly.

Under the Conservatives the foreign ministry (DFAIT) does not appear to enjoy the confidence, trust and respect which it once did. Once a leader in public diplomacy, the imposition of the – chillingly Orwellian – Message Event Proposal requirement means that the department’s staff cannot have an unscripted conversation outside the Pearson building and are now effectively gagged. There seems to be little appetite for the Department’s advice, and it is not being called upon to develop new international policy initiatives.

All of this may well have contributed to Canada’s shocking failure to win a seat on the UN Security Council.

Breaking with the past

The extent of the remaking of Canada’s role and place in the world becomes especially clear when the meagre international policy content of the last four years (under four foreign ministers) are compared, for instance, to the three and a half years of activist diplomacy in the late nineties under Lloyd Axworthy. During that period, with a lot of assistance from DFAIT, Canadian leadership helped to achieve a treaty to land mines, an International Criminal Court, and major initiatives on blood diamonds, children in conflict and humanitarian intervention (The Responsibility to Protect).

The contrast between the pursuit of the Human Security Agenda and the current level of inactivity is striking. Yet the post-9/11 departure from previous foreign policies has deeper roots.
Under PM Mulroney, Canada spearheaded the organization of the UN’s Rio Conference on Environment and Development, which produced the Framework Convention on Climate Change; the Statement of International Forestry Principles; the Biodiversity Convention, and; Agenda 21. Canada negotiated the FTA and NAFTA; it concluded treaties on acid rain and the protection of the ozone layer (Montreal Protocol), and; it worked within the Commonwealth to end apartheid in southern Africa.

These were significant diplomatic enterprises; the extent of the discontinuity with the present is unmistakable.

Grand strategy?

Moving forward, we are entering uncharted territory. As power and influence diffuse to other parts of the planet, the key challenge will be to manage the necessary accommodation more successfully in this century than was the case during the last, which was marked by two world wars and a Cold War.

Initial indications, however, are not encouraging.

There are few signs of any kind of grand strategy guiding Canada’s response to the re-emergence, after 400 years, of the Asia-Pacific region as the dynamic centre of the global political economy. Next year, in order to save $10 million, Canada will be alone among G-20 countries in its absence at  the Expo 2012 world’s fair in Yeosu, Korea. The theme of the Expo is “The Living Ocean and Coast” with sub themes of “Preservation and Sustainable Development of the Ocean and Coast,” “New Resources Technology,” and “Creative Marine Activities.”

Canada has the longest shoreline in the world, with frontage on three oceans…

Identity makeover

Over the course of the decade since 9/11, and more drastically over the past five years, Canada’s international image and reputation – our brand – have been fundamentally recast.  The once familiar helpful fixer, honest broker, generous aid donor and boy scout to the world has today become something quite different.

It would be in the interest of all Canadians – and perhaps even beyond – if the reconstruction of the Canadian brand were to be more widely acknowledged, debated and discussed.

A few weeks ago in Oslo, Norway, in the company of about 40 other invitees from around the world, I attended an OECD “experts” meeting, sponsored by the Norwegian and German Ministries of Education and Research, on the subject of Science, Technology, Innovation and Global Challenges.

The workshop was predicated upon the shared realization that if  international policy and decision-makers cannot be convinced that a radical course correction is needed, then in the not too distant future the planet may reach a tipping point. Beyond that point, recovery will be difficult, if not impossible.

Think climate change, diminishing biodiversity, food insecurity, resource scarcity, pandemic disease, and so forth.

So… we were talking about the principal threats imperilling life on the planet.

Not your standard bit of bureaucratic process.

Today, I am en route to Otago University in Dunedin, New Zealand, to speak at a conference entitled Science Diplomacy: New Day or False Dawn. Among many other speakers are Murray McCully, the Foreign Minister of New Zealand, Vaughn Turekian, head of  the science diplomacy unit at the American Academy for the Advancement of Science, and Dr. Jeffery Boutwell, from Pugwash USA.

Two global gatherings in two months on science, technology, diplomacy and international policy. Is it possible that something’s happening here, even if what is ain’t exactly clear?

Maybe.  I certainly hope so.

Here’s why – let me try and connect the dots.

Guerrilla Diplomacy’s central argument, in its most highly distilled form, is  that if development has in large part become the new security in the age of globalization, then diplomacy must displace defence at the centre of international policy.

In this formulation, diplomacy, which is all about privileging talking over fighting and using non-violent political communication rather than armed force to resolve international disputes, would be placed front and centre in international relations.

Traditional diplomacy involves the representatives of states transacting the business of government among and between themselves. By way of contrast, public diplomacy (PD) involves the use of dialogue, advocacy and other public relations tools by envoys engaging directly with foreign publics in order to influence their governments. PD has become a critical component of statecraft – not just in industrialized countries – and it looms large in the current literature on diplomatic studies.

Science diplomacy (SD) is a crucial, if under-utilized, component within the PD constellation, and it represents a significant source of soft power, that potent form of influence which is based on attraction and harnesses national influence, reputation, and brand. Science diplomacy is significant not only in its capacity to address many of the earth’s most urgent challenges, but also because it is an effective emissary of  important values such as evidence-based learning, openness and sharing.

The use of science to advance diplomatic ends is distinct from international scientific cooperation by virtue of its connection to government interests and objectives. Cooperation in the enterprise of international science is typically a win-win proposition, for instance by pulling together to find ways to produce clean water, improve hygiene or develop disease resistant crops. Science diplomacy might produce similar outcomes, but the results could just as easily be asymmetrical, particularly if there are negotiations involved. Arms control and non-proliferation talks during the Cold War, and a whole constellation of international scientific programs and exchanges undertaken during the second half of the last century come  immediately to mind.

Not all science diplomacy, it must be stressed, is devoted to the achievement of pacific ends. Covert collaboration involving, variously, Pakistan, Iran, China, North Korea and Libya on nuclear explosive and missile propulsion technologies is an illustrative case in point.

But… back to basics, to the idea of science itself. In a contested and competitive world of voodoo economics, bundled derivatives, radical politics and religious extremism, science proceeds from the assumption that misery is not fated: because all events are caused, all problems – eventually – can be solved.

At its best, science might be seen to represent the closest thing we have to universality, perhaps even truth.  In the roiling realm of international relations, science diplomacy  merits considerably more attention than it has recently been accorded.

It may be that the conference in Dunedin, like the meeting in Oslo, will break new ground.

I hope so.

There is much to be done and the clock is ticking.

Fast.

From May 18-20^th in Oslo, Norway, along with participants from some 40 countries and organizations around the world, I attended an “experts workshop” on Science, Technology and Innovation to Address Global Challenges. The meeting was organized jointly under OECD auspices by the Norwegian and German Ministries of Education and Research

The agenda included presentations and discussions on issues such as priority setting, funding, capacity building, and…

Asleep yet?

Well, this is your wake up call.

The Oslo meeting was far from a garden variety bureaucratic encounter. The rubber really hit the road during the final substantive session, which was innocuously entitled “Delivering Benefits.” At that point in the proceedings a consensus began to develop around a single, somewhat terrifying realization: If  international policy and decision-makers cannot be convinced that a radical course correction is needed, then in the not too distant future the world may reach a tipping point beyond which recovery will be difficult, if not impossible.

The consequences could well be catastrophic.

To understand how a group assembled by such a respectable institution as the OECD could reach such a disturbing conclusion, some sense of the over-arching analytical narrative is required. My  interpretation of the fundamental line of argument goes something like this.

In the globalization era, the most profound challenges to human survival — climate change, public health, diminishing biodiversity, and resource scarcity, to name a few — are rooted in science and driven by technology. Moreover, underdevelopment and insecurity, far more than religious extremism or political violence, represent fundamental threats to world order. In this context, the capacity to generate, absorb and use science and technology (S&T) could play a crucial role in improving security and development prospects. Addressing the needs of the poor, and bridging the digital divide could similarly become a pre-occupation of diplomacy.

Although poverty reduction contributes to development, and development is the flip side of security, S&T issues are largely alien to, and almost invisible within most international policy institutions. National governments, foreign ministries, development agencies, and indeed most multilateral organizations are without the scientific expertise, technological savvy, cultural pre-disposition or research and development (R&D) network access required to manage effectively. If this is to change, and in order to examine the remedial possibilities, politicians, opinion leaders and senior officials must be critically aware of both the dynamic inter-relationships among principal actors and the key questions and issues at play.

Unfortunately, their preoccupations lie almost entirely elsewhere.

The lion’s share of international policy resources are at present devoted to the military, which according to the rationale outlined above represents a colossal, and extremely costly misallocation. With a dominant international policy focus in many industrialized countries on counter-terrorism and the struggle against religious extremism and political violence, the threats and challenges which most imperil the planet remain largely unaddressed.

All told, this tale amounts to one terribly disturbing disconnect.

Because not only are the dots not joined-up.

In  most cases, there are no dots.

Whatever comes out of the Oslo meeting, it clearly will not, in itself, be enough to save the world. But if the project contributes to a more acute and widely-shared awareness of the real threat set, then we may all emerge at least with something in rather short supply under the present circumstances.

Hope.