In the previous post,  I argued that the short-lived era of unipolar American hegemony has given way to  a new international dispensation best characterized as heteropolar rather than multipolar. This metamorphosis may be attributed mainly to a series of colossal strategic misjudgements and the profusion of diverse sources of power and influence globally. The implications for security and diplomacy are profound.

To be sure, and as was the case with the multipolar world dominated by the European Empires from the 15th to 19th centuries, there are once again many poles. But this time the differences between them far outweigh the similarities. These players share little in common.  Unlike in previous eras, the heterogeneous nature of today’s competing actors renders comparison difficult and measurement even more so.

That said, and although this is very much a new order in the making, we can begin to trace the contours and discern the content of heteropolarity, a condition which I believe will increasingly define international relations. New poles are forming, and old poles are evolving. In terms of identifying the major heteropoles in the early years of the 21st century, the following thoughts come immediately to mind.

The USA, even with a slightly leaner (but still growing) defence budget, will for the foreseeable future remain the world’s leading military, or hard power. It will continue as a leading centre of R&D, innovation, private enterprise, and post-secondary education; the notion of broad decline is hotly contested. However, as predicted by President Eisenhower in his farewell address over 50 years ago, an increasing reliance upon military strength is rendering America the praetorian pole. Its fundamental economic and industrial position in relative terms is fading fast, a trend accelerated by the hollowing out of its manufacturing sector, and compounded by the continuing financial crisis and the cost of foreign wars. Within a decade or two the mantle of leadership, and pride of place as the epicentre of the world economy, may well pass to the Asia-Pacific region generally, and to China in particular – with India not that far behind.

Together, these two countries will soon represent over one half of the world’s population. China is already the fastest growing manufacturing and industrial economy and the largest provider of consumer goods. With an increasing reliance upon advanced technologies, China is moving rapidly up the value-added chain. For its part, India is now the world’s back office, call centre and software incubator, offering services in the English language at prices no one can match.  Each of these poles is looking for increased recognition and for ways to advance their growing interests. Unlike the old superpowers, however, their middle classes are burgeoning rather than shrinking, and they are not rattling sabres.

Elsewhere, post-tsunami Japan, though often overlooked, is still the world’s third largest economy and a huge participant in international trade, investment and finance. Overtaken in GDP terms last year by China, the prospect of having to accommodate new rivals throughout the rest of rising Asia is likely to present Japan with significant political and cultural challenges.

Brazil today is closer than ever to the realization of its enormous potential. That country has secured its place as the political and economic dynamo of Latin America, and has become much more assertive in the international arena, and particularly in organizations such as the WTO. Brazil’s newfound heteropolar identity may find expression as a champion of cultural diversity or as the leader of the Global South.

Russia, as a residual empire with still-extant nuclear capability, seems intent upon consolidating its role as Eurasia’s energy and resource pole. These ambitions are abetted by its vast geo-strategic presence, memories of greatness and the perceived need to reassert its influence both in the “near abroad” and beyond. Europeans, especially, are wary of their growing dependence.

And, speaking of Europe… Beset by the current debt and monetary crisis, it is easy to lose sight of the forest for the trees. While it will take time, and likely another recession, the Euro-zone’s present problems will eventually be worked through. Over the longer term, the continent’s strong suit of peace, prosperity, safe and livable cities, excellent public infrastructure, a rich historical heritage and thriving artistic and cultural life suggests that the EU is destined to lead the world in soft power, the power of attraction. The source of the Europe’s strength and the basis of its comparative advantage will reside not in a common defence and security policy, but in the demonstration effect, in the ability of Europe to project its success by example internationally.

Heteropoles are forming in all shapes and sizes. Certain countries, such as Turkey, Iran, South Africa, Egypt and Mexico, as well as regions, such as Southeast Asia and the Gulf states, will almost certainly figure in this new order.  Yet the emergence of a heteropolar world, one in which the drivers and ends of power and influence are no longer easily meshed, will inevitably cause friction. Among and between poles, edges are sharp, competition fierce, objectives divergent and interests difficult to align. Direct connection on issues of mutual concern, such as trade, the environment, and intellectual property, has already become difficult. Finding the basis for bargaining will be tough, the identification of trade-offs elusive and the act of balancing dizzyingly complex.

As has happened with the global economy, volatility in international relations is likely to become the new normal. Fragile states will fail. Sparks will fly. The trick will be to find ways to prevent fires. In that regard, while deterrence may still have a role, the actual use of armed force is unlikely to be of much utility.

Ready or not, heterpolarity means that it is now diplomacy which must be placed front and centre.

Today the contributors to a recently released collection of essays assembled under this title and edited by Janice Stein will gather in Toronto to discuss the lifetime contribution to the diplomatic profession of  former Ambassador to the USA Allan Gotlieb.

It is encouraging to see attention of this nature being directed towards the study of diplomacy. Over my 30 years of diplomatic practice and scholarship, I could never understand why so many mainstream educators, senior officials and analysts spent so little time trying to understand or assess the inner workings of the world’s second oldest profession.

Diplomacy is an approach to the management of international relations founded upon the use of non-violent political communications such as dialogue, negotiation and compromise for purposes of conflict resolution and problem-solving. In my experience, many serving diplomats are not entirely sure of that definition, or of how their work is related to the achievement of international peace, security and prosperity. That observation notwithstanding, I would argue that diplomacy has never been more relevant.

I expect that many of the participants in today’s symposium share that perspective.

Three of the new volume’s four subtitles – Diplomacy with the United States in the Era of Wikileaks; The Professional Diplomat on Facebook, and; Personal Diplomacy in the Age of Twitter – make reference to manifestations of the what is widely referred to as the new media, a communications venue has come to occupy a significant place within the operations of several of the world’s more innovative foreign ministries. 

Digital diplomacy is a catchy term, but, like diplomacy itself,  it is not clearly understood.  Also referred to variously as e-, i-, cyber or virtual diplomacy, it has been made possible by the adoption, within diplomatic institutions and government more generally, of digitally-based systems of data creation, transmission and storage using the Internet, social media platforms, computers, and a variety of wireless electronic devices.

The diplomatic means, therefore, are evolving to keep pace with the times, and especially with the need to connect directly with foreign populations, but the ends are largely immutable.

The threat or use of armed force will always have its place in the world, but that place is now dramatically over-represented. Since the end of the Cold War, and in the wake of disasters in Iraq and Afghanistan, the limitations associated with the continued militarization of international policy could not be clearer. The reality is that the most profound threats and challenges which imperil the planet – climate change, resource scarcity, diminishing bio-diversity, environmental collapse – are rooted in science and driven by technology.

International cooperation to broach these complex and difficult issues cannot be undertaken using anything other than diplomacy, whether traditional, public, digital,  or guerrilla, which combines elements of all three.

Long-term, sustainable and human-centred development has become the basis for durable security in the digital age, and for that reason diplomacy must displace defence at the centre of international policy. In a globalized precincts of the 21st century, talking rather than fighting is the only way forward.

I hope that conviction finds expression and support at today’s event.  

A few weeks ago in Oslo, Norway, in the company of about 40 other invitees from around the world, I attended an OECD “experts” meeting, sponsored by the Norwegian and German Ministries of Education and Research, on the subject of Science, Technology, Innovation and Global Challenges.

The workshop was predicated upon the shared realization that if  international policy and decision-makers cannot be convinced that a radical course correction is needed, then in the not too distant future the planet may reach a tipping point. Beyond that point, recovery will be difficult, if not impossible.

Think climate change, diminishing biodiversity, food insecurity, resource scarcity, pandemic disease, and so forth.

So… we were talking about the principal threats imperilling life on the planet.

Not your standard bit of bureaucratic process.

Today, I am en route to Otago University in Dunedin, New Zealand, to speak at a conference entitled Science Diplomacy: New Day or False Dawn. Among many other speakers are Murray McCully, the Foreign Minister of New Zealand, Vaughn Turekian, head of  the science diplomacy unit at the American Academy for the Advancement of Science, and Dr. Jeffery Boutwell, from Pugwash USA.

Two global gatherings in two months on science, technology, diplomacy and international policy. Is it possible that something’s happening here, even if what is ain’t exactly clear?

Maybe.  I certainly hope so.

Here’s why – let me try and connect the dots.

Guerrilla Diplomacy’s central argument, in its most highly distilled form, is  that if development has in large part become the new security in the age of globalization, then diplomacy must displace defence at the centre of international policy.

In this formulation, diplomacy, which is all about privileging talking over fighting and using non-violent political communication rather than armed force to resolve international disputes, would be placed front and centre in international relations.

Traditional diplomacy involves the representatives of states transacting the business of government among and between themselves. By way of contrast, public diplomacy (PD) involves the use of dialogue, advocacy and other public relations tools by envoys engaging directly with foreign publics in order to influence their governments. PD has become a critical component of statecraft – not just in industrialized countries – and it looms large in the current literature on diplomatic studies.

Science diplomacy (SD) is a crucial, if under-utilized, component within the PD constellation, and it represents a significant source of soft power, that potent form of influence which is based on attraction and harnesses national influence, reputation, and brand. Science diplomacy is significant not only in its capacity to address many of the earth’s most urgent challenges, but also because it is an effective emissary of  important values such as evidence-based learning, openness and sharing.

The use of science to advance diplomatic ends is distinct from international scientific cooperation by virtue of its connection to government interests and objectives. Cooperation in the enterprise of international science is typically a win-win proposition, for instance by pulling together to find ways to produce clean water, improve hygiene or develop disease resistant crops. Science diplomacy might produce similar outcomes, but the results could just as easily be asymmetrical, particularly if there are negotiations involved. Arms control and non-proliferation talks during the Cold War, and a whole constellation of international scientific programs and exchanges undertaken during the second half of the last century come  immediately to mind.

Not all science diplomacy, it must be stressed, is devoted to the achievement of pacific ends. Covert collaboration involving, variously, Pakistan, Iran, China, North Korea and Libya on nuclear explosive and missile propulsion technologies is an illustrative case in point.

But… back to basics, to the idea of science itself. In a contested and competitive world of voodoo economics, bundled derivatives, radical politics and religious extremism, science proceeds from the assumption that misery is not fated: because all events are caused, all problems – eventually – can be solved.

At its best, science might be seen to represent the closest thing we have to universality, perhaps even truth.  In the roiling realm of international relations, science diplomacy  merits considerably more attention than it has recently been accorded.

It may be that the conference in Dunedin, like the meeting in Oslo, will break new ground.

I hope so.

There is much to be done and the clock is ticking.

Fast.

From May 18-20^th in Oslo, Norway, along with participants from some 40 countries and organizations around the world, I attended an “experts workshop” on Science, Technology and Innovation to Address Global Challenges. The meeting was organized jointly under OECD auspices by the Norwegian and German Ministries of Education and Research

The agenda included presentations and discussions on issues such as priority setting, funding, capacity building, and…

Asleep yet?

Well, this is your wake up call.

The Oslo meeting was far from a garden variety bureaucratic encounter. The rubber really hit the road during the final substantive session, which was innocuously entitled “Delivering Benefits.” At that point in the proceedings a consensus began to develop around a single, somewhat terrifying realization: If  international policy and decision-makers cannot be convinced that a radical course correction is needed, then in the not too distant future the world may reach a tipping point beyond which recovery will be difficult, if not impossible.

The consequences could well be catastrophic.

To understand how a group assembled by such a respectable institution as the OECD could reach such a disturbing conclusion, some sense of the over-arching analytical narrative is required. My  interpretation of the fundamental line of argument goes something like this.

In the globalization era, the most profound challenges to human survival — climate change, public health, diminishing biodiversity, and resource scarcity, to name a few — are rooted in science and driven by technology. Moreover, underdevelopment and insecurity, far more than religious extremism or political violence, represent fundamental threats to world order. In this context, the capacity to generate, absorb and use science and technology (S&T) could play a crucial role in improving security and development prospects. Addressing the needs of the poor, and bridging the digital divide could similarly become a pre-occupation of diplomacy.

Although poverty reduction contributes to development, and development is the flip side of security, S&T issues are largely alien to, and almost invisible within most international policy institutions. National governments, foreign ministries, development agencies, and indeed most multilateral organizations are without the scientific expertise, technological savvy, cultural pre-disposition or research and development (R&D) network access required to manage effectively. If this is to change, and in order to examine the remedial possibilities, politicians, opinion leaders and senior officials must be critically aware of both the dynamic inter-relationships among principal actors and the key questions and issues at play.

Unfortunately, their preoccupations lie almost entirely elsewhere.

The lion’s share of international policy resources are at present devoted to the military, which according to the rationale outlined above represents a colossal, and extremely costly misallocation. With a dominant international policy focus in many industrialized countries on counter-terrorism and the struggle against religious extremism and political violence, the threats and challenges which most imperil the planet remain largely unaddressed.

All told, this tale amounts to one terribly disturbing disconnect.

Because not only are the dots not joined-up.

In  most cases, there are no dots.

Whatever comes out of the Oslo meeting, it clearly will not, in itself, be enough to save the world. But if the project contributes to a more acute and widely-shared awareness of the real threat set, then we may all emerge at least with something in rather short supply under the present circumstances.

Hope.

Stand-off in Tunis.

Riots in Khartoum

Cairo burning.

In the erstwhile global village, which today looks more like an island patchwork of  heavily guarded, gated communities surrounded by an angry sea of seething shantytowns, the relentless forces of globalization continue to transform world politics. Cairo is the current, and increasingly turbulent epicentre, but many countries in the region are susceptible to similar rebellions.

In Egypt, Tunisia, Sudan and elsewhere, change is unfolding very rapidly. The reactions of the USA, EU, UN, and certainly Canada have positioned the international community well behind the curve. Developments on the ground have outpaced responses by a wide margin, and an anti-Western backlash, which could carry major economic and political implications, cannot be ruled out.

What, then, are the the broad strategic considerations which decision-makers could usefully take into account?

Several of the principal arguments advanced in Guerrilla Diplomacy may offer insights useful in interpreting the larger meaning and impact of these breaking events. The following thematic survey is offered to that end.

Globalization has become a driver of instability and a major contributor to insurrection.

As the defining historical process of our times, globalization generates wealth and creates opportunities, but not for all. The benefits tend to be uneven, which can result in increasing inequity and polarization within and between states. A few beneficiaries are squeezed upwards, while those less fortunate are forced down. Some win, more lose, and few are left untouched. Under certain circumstances, such as rising unemployment or food and fuel price increases, this volatile combination can trigger the collective release of anger and disaffection, often expressed through revolt. That dynamic, destabilizing response to globalization is one of the major forces animating today’s news.

Science and technology is a two-edged sword which cuts all ways.

In previous postings I have noted that even as science and technology (S&T) provide solutions to some of the world’s most difficult problems, they can also generate new ones. This has been illustrated clearly in the case with the WikiLeaks revelations. In North Africa, technology has until now allowed for ever more efficient repression, but today is fuelling and abetting resistance. Negative perceptions have been exacerbated and protest planning facilitated by widespread and relatively inexpensive access to information and communications technologies, such as cell phones and the internet. Twitter, Facebook, and YouTube, for example, are said to have figured centrally in the Tunisian uprising; efforts by the Mubarak regime to forestall similar developments in Egypt by shutting down network access have not been entirely successful. In the age of globalization, S&T makes possible the formation of virtual communities almost instantly and represents a critical new variable.

Underdevelopment breeds insecurity.

Development is a somewhat amorphous concept, but it occurs where individuals are able to attain some semblance of their full economic, social and political potential without undue or unjust constraint. From development flows security, which flourishes when people are able to meet their basic needs in the absence of want and fear. Security and development, therefore, are joined at the hip, two sides of the same coin. In North Africa, however, growing income disparities, an expanding youth demographic, and skyrocketing unemployment have conspired to ensure that neither are much in evidence. This combination of underdevelopment and insecurity, as we are witnessing,  can be explosive.

Religious fanaticism and political violence are symptomatic mainly of deeper problems

To date, most of the action in the streets has been non-violent in nature and secular in orientation. Given the chance, and particularly if strides are made towards democracy, good governance, respect for human rights and the rule of law, it is my experience that most people would rather pursue economic and educational opportunities than resort to jihad or seek violent retribution. But if already pronounced conditions of exploitation and injustice are ignored or exacerbated, then desperation may grow, especially if disorder spreads and shortages become epidemic. Should real reform be thwarted or material circumstances worsen, everything could change, with those offering extreme solutions moving into fill the void.

Western military power is largely irrelevant

In many underdeveloped countries, the bureaucracy is reviled and the military is respected, if not revered as one of the few national institutions that functions. In the industrialized world, however, although the civilian agencies of government work passably well, what really sets the armed forces apart from other international policy instruments is their receipt of the lion’s share of available resources. Given that bombs and guns can’t be used to address the variety of real threats and challenges facing the planet – climate change, pandemic disease, poverty, environmental collapse – this represents a serious misallocation. We seem to have forgotten the main lesson that should have been learned from the Cold War, namely that armies work best when they aren’t used.  Similarly, today in the southern Mediterranean, sending in the marines, blockading the ports or calling in an air strike will not encourage the desired outcomes. Besides being costly to maintain, hard power is of very limited utility in a heteropolar world.  Nuanced understanding and effective civil assistance are more likely to produce laudable results.

Diplomacy could make a difference

In Washington, Brussels, Paris, London and elsewhere, the current crisis underscores the difficulties  inherent in trying to balance values and interests, and in expressing that balance through the articulation of coherent international policy. When autocratic regimes have been supported for decades, and even when the status quo becomes obviously untenable, it is difficult to know how best to respond. This is precisely where engaging the negotiating, knowledge-based  problem solving, and complex balancing capacities of diplomacy should be invaluable. Conventional, state-to state representational mechanisms can be used to help ease former friends from office and into exile. Public diplomacy may be used to support peace and progress, and to communicate the views of concerned governments directly to foreign populations. Guerrilla diplomacy is ideally suited, among other things, to the cultivation of ties with the emerging resistance leaders, and to generating intelligence at the grass roots level. Unfortunately, guerrilla diplomacy remains next to non-existent, and foreign ministries most everywhere, under-funded and struggling to adapt, are ill-equipped to perform.

Looking ahead? A demonstration effect is roiling the region, and more extensive turmoil can be anticipated.  The events unfolding in Tunis, Cairo, and Khartoum illustrate that in the age of globalization, governments need desperately to find a better way to deliver international policy. In that respect, a focus on diplomacy and development could be used to address the root causes of insecurity, and in a way that works without the manifold costs associated with the threat or use of armed force.

Security, after all, is not a martial art.