In the previous post, I tried to show that during the 1980s and ‘90s the paradigm for the delivery of Canadian international policy shifted fundamentally. Over the course of those years, there was a deliberate move away from an emphasis on traditional, state-to-state interaction in the direction of public diplomacy (PD). This form of international political exchange features diplomats communicating directly with foreign populations and cultivating partnerships with civil society actors – NGOs, businesspeople, journalists and academics.  I also made the case that the PD formula, in conjunction with the right combination of political will and bureaucratic skill, can produce impressive results, especially if directed towards projects with broad popular and media appeal, such as a land mine ban or efforts to improve the lot of children in conflict zones.

Looking back, it can be seen that Canadian PD reached its apogee under Foreign Minister Axworthy (1996-2000). At a time of severe government-wide cost-cutting, Canada fundamentally down-sized its international ambitions, but that exercise was not translated into a retreat from the field. To be sure, the large scale, long range, potentially world changing projects of the post-war decades  – poverty eradication, conflict resolution, global environmental conservation – were gone. In their place, Canadian officials proposed a series of special projects – for example, curbs on the trading of “blood” diamonds and small arms – designed for implementation within media-friendly diplomatic niches. They did not always succeed, but each initiative featured a defined start and finish. Upon completion, the Minister could simply call a press conference, declare victory and move on.

Minister Axworthy learned, and very quickly, how the use of soft power could make a virtue of necessity. Conventional diplomacy was still necessary, but it was no longer sufficient when it came to influencing foreign governments. That influence was best brought to bear through their publics, and through international public opinion, especially when compulsion was not an option and democratization had expanded the scope for exercising influence indirectly.

The requirements associated with this burst of activism imposed significant costs upon DFAIT’s staff, already struggling under the burden of increased demands and reduced resources.  Moreover, some strategic opportunities were missed. In 1996-97, for instance, the department’s Communications Bureau proposed the launch of an ambitious project which would have vaulted Canada into the digital age by establishing an integrated global presence based upon satellite broadcasting, the internet, public diplomacy, international education and branding.  In the end, however, at a time of diminishing capacity across government, the Canadian International Information Strategy (CIIS) lost out in Cabinet to the campaign to ban land mines (later christened the “Ottawa Process”). Canada might today be more effective and influential in the world had circumstances – particularly timing and the economic environment – been more propitious during that critical period.

In bureaucracy, there is often a lag between action and reflection. The Axworthy years were so frenetic that there was little time to think through the full implications of his program in terms of the design, structure and operations of the foreign ministry. As a result, generic interest in PD within the DFAIT apparatus actually peaked following Axworthy’s departure. For the first five years of the new century, significant efforts were made weave PD into the department’s modus operandi. A new PD Secretariat was established in Washington to coordinate advocacy activities in the USA. The idea of  “mainstreaming public diplomacy” was central to a comprehensive reform package launched by DFAIT’s  Deputy Ministers in 2004 and entitled Building a 21^st Century Foreign Ministry, or FAC21. When Prime Minister Chretien stepped down the same year, the new leader, Paul Martin, commissioned a comprehensive international policy review. In the final, five volume report, A Place of Pride and Influence in the World, PD was highlighted as “the new diplomacy”.

Although it has been scarcely more than a decade since Axworthy left office, the years of Canadian public diplomatic activism now seem long ago and far away. Ironically, despite the many practical successes and, later, some focused internal interest, PD never received the extent of budgetary support which might have been anticipated. This is doubly curious because although Axworthy’s Liberal successors, John Manley, Bill Graham and Pierre Pettigrew, did not share his enthusiasm for human security, they did seem to buy into PD. Manley mandated a public diplomacy working group within the secretariat conducting his – albeit short-lived -  Foreign Policy Update in 2001, and beginning in 2003 Graham used the interactive potential of the internet to reach out to Canadians with his Foreign Policy Dialogue. But political interest in undertaking concrete diplomatic initiatives had waned well before the January, 2006 election of a Conservative minority government. Almost immediately, the previous administration’s policy review was shelved, government communications were centralized and placed under strict control, and DFAIT officials were gagged.

Canadian public diplomacy, already in decline and tainted lethally by its association with the outgoing Liberal government, effectively disappeared.

Memories of independent Canadian leadership on global issues are receding, the drift towards continental integration continues.

In May 2011 the Conservative party was returned with a majority, and John Baird, a prominent and influential Tory insider, was named Foreign Minister. The new minister speaks of the need for a “tough”  foreign policy, and the overall emphasis favours the military over diplomacy and development assistance. Yet there are stirrings within DFAIT of a possible PD renewal. A modest experiment has been launched allowing several of Canada’s European ambassadors to engage foreign audiences using social media platforms Twitter and Facebook, and this enterprise may eventually be expanded to include the participation of all Canadian missions.

That said, even under a best case scenario Canada will still be trailing most of its diplomatic competition, both within the OECD and beyond. Unless and until DFAIT regains the full confidence, trust and respect of its political masters, and is once again called upon to perform, any return to the halcyon days of Canadian PD activism seems unlikely.

I have recently been reviewing a new book entitled Diplomacy in the Digital Age, which is a collection of essays prepared in honour of Allan Gotlieb, a former Undersecretary of State  for External Affairs and Canada’s ambassador in Washington from 1981-89. It is an absorbing anthology, and contains valuable entries penned in some instances by those who worked with Mr. Gotlieb during his time in the USA. Quite apart from eliciting specific reactions to the content of the volume, reading it has also spurred me to reflect on the larger issue of what became of Canada’s once considerable contribution to the study and practice of public diplomacy (PD).

The Government of Canada was until fairly recently regarded as a somewhat of PD pioneer. That reputation would now be difficult to sustain. Indeed, I have come to the rather stark realization that whatever this country may at one time have achieved by way of advancing its interests through PD, those days are now long gone.

In official and political circles in Ottawa today, little or nothing is heard of PD. Diplomatic representatives can no longer connect directly with foreign populations unless their scripts have been pre-cleared, and even the use of the term has been discouraged. Within the foreign ministry (DFAIT), the function has been almost completely de-resourced.

Hence the questions must be put: what, exactly, did Canada manage to achieve in terms of public diplomacy outcomes over the past several decades?  Why has PD fallen from grace? Can any lessons of broader relevance be adduced?

Canadian academics, and several several serving and former diplomats have over time been active in the conceptualization and analysis of PD. Publications such as Allan Gotlieb’s I’ll Be With You in a Minute, Mr. Ambassador, Gordon Smith’s Virtual Diplomacy, Rob McRae and Don Hubert’s Human Security and the New Diplomacy, Andy Cooper’s Celebrity Diplomacy, Evan Potter’s Branding Canada, and perhaps even my own Guerrilla Diplomacy have been seen by some to break new ground in the field.

In addition to these intellectual contributions, the Canadian foreign ministry has been deeply involved in the practical application of PD. Beginning in the 1980s, most of Canada’s major diplomatic undertakings – the 1981 Cancun Summit on North-South relations; Prime Minister Trudeau’s 1984 peace crusade; the acid rain and free trade pacts with the USA;  the 1987 Montreal Protocol on ozone layer depletion, and; the Commonwealth campaign to end apartheid in southern Africa – included a significant PD component. Even if not labeled as public diplomacy at the time, a willingness to connect directly with foreign populations, the strategic use of the media, and tactics such as forging partnerships with business and civil society were integral to each of these initiatives.

In early in the 1990s, and quite explicitly so by the second half of the decade, PD moved even closer to the centre of Canadian international policy.  In the organization and delivery of the 1992 Rio Summit on Environment and Development,  throughout the so-called “fish war” with Spain in 1994, and particularly during the four year tenure of Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy (1996-2000), PD, and the related notion of soft power, were the order of the day.

Charged with implementing the severe expenditure reductions  associated with the government-wide Program Review exercise of the mid-1990s, Axworthy must have concluded that the page had to be turned on old ways, and that global order projects would accordingly have to be set aside. But he was clearly not prepared to accept that this meant inaction. To the contrary, he demanded that DFAIT officials identify innovative ways for Canada to “make a difference”. He was determined to find opportunity in adversity, even if faced with opposition on the part of the US and other major powers, and indeed of many Canadians.

DFAIT staff rose to the challenge, and came forth with a series of proposals. In the campaigns leading to the signature of the Treaty Banning Land Mines in 1997 and to the establishment of the International Criminal Court in 1998,  Axworthy attained his objectives by nurturing  partnerships with international civil society and similarly-inclined countries. He also reached out in an unprecedented fashion to the journalists, the academic community and NGOs at home, mainly through creation of the Canadian Centre for Foreign Policy Development and the Public Diplomacy Fund at DFAIT.

The same approach, in varying degrees, was seen in initiatives intended to limit the spread of small arms, to underscore the plight of children in war zones and curb the use of child soldiers, and to restrict the sale of “conflict diamonds” through the launch of the Kimberly Process. Canada also sponsored the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, whose final report, The Responsibility to Protect, though initially overtaken by the events of 9/11, resurfaced and was adopted in principle at the UN Millennium Summit in September 2005.

Taken together, Axworthy’s achievements were artfully – and, in part, retrospectively – packaged by officials into a remarkably coherent program which came to be known as the Human Security Agenda. Although that policy direction did not survive for long following the Minister’s departure from office, the record of activity in the second half of the 1990s stands nonetheless as enduring testament to the power and potential of Canadian PD. It was a high point which has not since been revisited. To a significant extent, I would suggest that whatever remains Canada’s positive international reputation – its brand –  still relies on these, and earlier accomplishments.

I will return to an assessment of PD’s decline in the next post.

A few weeks ago in Oslo, Norway, in the company of about 40 other invitees from around the world, I attended an OECD “experts” meeting, sponsored by the Norwegian and German Ministries of Education and Research, on the subject of Science, Technology, Innovation and Global Challenges.

The workshop was predicated upon the shared realization that if  international policy and decision-makers cannot be convinced that a radical course correction is needed, then in the not too distant future the planet may reach a tipping point. Beyond that point, recovery will be difficult, if not impossible.

Think climate change, diminishing biodiversity, food insecurity, resource scarcity, pandemic disease, and so forth.

So… we were talking about the principal threats imperilling life on the planet.

Not your standard bit of bureaucratic process.

Today, I am en route to Otago University in Dunedin, New Zealand, to speak at a conference entitled Science Diplomacy: New Day or False Dawn. Among many other speakers are Murray McCully, the Foreign Minister of New Zealand, Vaughn Turekian, head of  the science diplomacy unit at the American Academy for the Advancement of Science, and Dr. Jeffery Boutwell, from Pugwash USA.

Two global gatherings in two months on science, technology, diplomacy and international policy. Is it possible that something’s happening here, even if what is ain’t exactly clear?

Maybe.  I certainly hope so.

Here’s why – let me try and connect the dots.

Guerrilla Diplomacy’s central argument, in its most highly distilled form, is  that if development has in large part become the new security in the age of globalization, then diplomacy must displace defence at the centre of international policy.

In this formulation, diplomacy, which is all about privileging talking over fighting and using non-violent political communication rather than armed force to resolve international disputes, would be placed front and centre in international relations.

Traditional diplomacy involves the representatives of states transacting the business of government among and between themselves. By way of contrast, public diplomacy (PD) involves the use of dialogue, advocacy and other public relations tools by envoys engaging directly with foreign publics in order to influence their governments. PD has become a critical component of statecraft – not just in industrialized countries – and it looms large in the current literature on diplomatic studies.

Science diplomacy (SD) is a crucial, if under-utilized, component within the PD constellation, and it represents a significant source of soft power, that potent form of influence which is based on attraction and harnesses national influence, reputation, and brand. Science diplomacy is significant not only in its capacity to address many of the earth’s most urgent challenges, but also because it is an effective emissary of  important values such as evidence-based learning, openness and sharing.

The use of science to advance diplomatic ends is distinct from international scientific cooperation by virtue of its connection to government interests and objectives. Cooperation in the enterprise of international science is typically a win-win proposition, for instance by pulling together to find ways to produce clean water, improve hygiene or develop disease resistant crops. Science diplomacy might produce similar outcomes, but the results could just as easily be asymmetrical, particularly if there are negotiations involved. Arms control and non-proliferation talks during the Cold War, and a whole constellation of international scientific programs and exchanges undertaken during the second half of the last century come  immediately to mind.

Not all science diplomacy, it must be stressed, is devoted to the achievement of pacific ends. Covert collaboration involving, variously, Pakistan, Iran, China, North Korea and Libya on nuclear explosive and missile propulsion technologies is an illustrative case in point.

But… back to basics, to the idea of science itself. In a contested and competitive world of voodoo economics, bundled derivatives, radical politics and religious extremism, science proceeds from the assumption that misery is not fated: because all events are caused, all problems – eventually – can be solved.

At its best, science might be seen to represent the closest thing we have to universality, perhaps even truth.  In the roiling realm of international relations, science diplomacy  merits considerably more attention than it has recently been accorded.

It may be that the conference in Dunedin, like the meeting in Oslo, will break new ground.

I hope so.

There is much to be done and the clock is ticking.

Fast.

Parts I and II of this series have examined the role and place – or lack thereof – of science and technology in diplomacy and international policy. How do those observations play out in reference to Canada, and, by extension, for members of the international community more generally?

The Canadian case brings many of these issues, and in particular the aspect of unfulfilled possibilities, into stark relief. Notwithstanding its humiliating electoral defeat at the UN, Canada retains a significant comparative advantage  vis-a-vis the global competition in terms of soft power.  A large part of this advantage may be attributed to default, that is, to the things which this country doesn’t  have or do, such as carry colonial baggage or harbor aggressive global ambitions. And however undeserved, Canada still enjoys a very positive international image and reputation. It’s brand was recently ranked the world’s best.

Unthreatening  and nice.

Cosmopolitan and approachable.

Open and welcoming.

The globalization nation.

Canada, moreover, has the capacity – educational, scientific and representational – necessary to make a substantial contribution to science diplomacy. Before that potential can be realized, however, significant reform will be required.

For instance, the Foreign Ministry, DFAIT, should be centrally placed as the Canada’s globalization entrepot, an international docking mechanism and whole-of-government catalyst for the high level management of cross-cutting, inter-sectoral issues. These issues could range from the promotion of human rights or the rule of law to the pursuit of international security. None would be the responsibility of any single line department; the management of globalization is nobody else’s job.

Yet is DFAIT moving to re-invent itself as a central agency for ensuring the coordination and coherence of all aspects of international policy?

No.

Instead, Foreign Ministry is being starved of resources and generally sidelined, marginalized and ignored.

Are diplomats being empowered  serve as  globalization managers, using their access to the Global Political Economy of Knowledge to address transnational issues? Again, no, despite the fact that engaging in S&T knowledge-based problem solving has become a critical diplomatic competence in the emerging heteropolar world.

Regrettably, science diplomacy is almost completely absent from the diplomatic mix, S&T knowledge is not considered a key competence in foreign service  recruitment. S&T partnerships – even basic S&T relationships – with universities, NGOs, think tanks and business are few to non-existent.

In other words, it is not just that the dots are not connected.

Typically, there are no dots.

What would be required to build bridges between the largely disconnected worlds of S&T and diplomacy?

Canada needs a grand strategy with a major S&T component. DFAIT needs to articulate a comprehensive international S&T policy, and establish a responsibility centre for the implementation of an action plan which will give legs (and performance benchmarks, and a time line) to the strategy and policy.

Clearly, some significant personnel and institutional changes will be necessary. As this is largely the stuff of public administration rather than international policy, I offer these recommendations in point form only:

Within DFAIT:

• Appoint an International S&T Advisor to Deputy Minister. Creation of such a position has been frequently recommended – the US and UK have long had such advisors – but never acted upon.
• Create new Bureau, under a Director General, for International S&T affairs. Unlike the current, trade-centred S&T enterprise, this larger entity would straddle both the international commerce and political sides of the Department, and a include robust policy development/analysis capability.
• Intensify ties with the International Development Research Centre; National Research Council; Industry Canada and other science-based departments and research councils; universities; think tanks; NGOs.
• Increase resident bench strength by bringing the outside in and turning inside out through a targeted program of secondments, exchanges, and internships.
• Enlarge S&T training and professional development opportunities.
• Add International S&T courses and learning modules to the curriculum of the Canadian Foreign Service Institute.
• Develop a Canadian International S&T strategy,  policy, and action plan, focusing on points where Canadian capacity, national interests and global needs intersect.

At the national level:

• Rescind the extraordinary controls on scientific and diplomatic communications (MEPs, etc.).
• Restore the position of Science Advisor to the Prime Minister and house that function  in the Privy Council Office (it was downgraded and moved to Industry Canada after the 2006 election).
• Consider re-creating a Ministry of State for Science and Technology as a stand alone entity with a mandate to improve linkages between those with S&T knowledge and those with responsibility for public policy, administration and management, and; to serve as a clearing house for S&T research and intelligence.

There is much to be done to equip Canada for the successful practice of science diplomacy. But if the will could be found to express Canada’s abundant soft power through imaginative policy-making and enlightened institutions vested with resource suffiency, then this country might once again be positioned to make a real difference in the world.

Part I of this series examined the relationships – or lack thereof – between diplomacy, science and international policy, and noted the serious image problems which plague all three enterprises. These difficulties have hobbled the practice of science diplomacy, and are compounded by a host of substantial issues, which will be addressed presently. First, however, it may be useful to unpack the key terms.

Not unlike “intelligence” or  “policy”, “science” and “technology” are words frequently invoked in both conversation and writing. More often than not, however, the users have little more than an intuitive sense of what these terms actually mean.

Science and Development

An evidence-based and collegial form of  knowledge acquisition, science is founded upon empirical methods and the repeated verification of results. Neither inherently political nor ideological, it is a type of universal language, a vector of transnational communications which poses fundamental questions about the nature of things. Science is long term in orientation, bottom-up in origin, and collaborative by design. The findings of most scientific enquiry become part of the public realm. Most importantly, science and the reaearch which underpins it proceed from the assumption that all events are caused, and that all causes can – eventually – be determined.  That means that misery is not fated and that adversity can be rolled back through the creation of new knowledge – to prevent and cure disease, discover alternative energy sources, invent new materials, and so forth. At its best, science enlarges understanding and encourages development.

Science also plays an important role in the formation and conditioning of intellectual culture and national values. In its scope and methodology, science helps to inform current analysis and educate enquiring minds. The scientific ethos of objective experimentation through trial and error has broad appeal: it promotes merit (through peer review); openness (through publication); civic values and citizen empowerment (through the encouragement of respect for diverse perspectives). In short, science advances learning in a transparent, participatory and inclusive manner. It represents a cornerstone of humanity’s progress.

Technology and National Interests

Technology, on the other hand, is applied knowledge. Its relationship to science is not, as is widely believed, always linear, and it is deeply implicated in the defining historical process of our times, globalization. Because technology touches more directly and immediately upon government and private sector interests, its development is often top-down, short term, competitive and demand-driven. As the possession and use of technology can confer advantage, the latest technological innovations are often licensed, sold, used as bargaining chips, or otherwise protected as private goods.  As a tool in the hands of man, technology is related more closely than science to the possession and use of power, which is the capacity to achieve specified outcomes. Technology, therefore, tends to be regarded and used as an instrument of international policy.

It follows that science and technology per se should occupy a large, and very central place in diplomacy and international policy. The reality, however, is quite the opposite. Foreign ministries, development agencies, and indeed most multilateral organizations are without the scientific expertise, technological savvy, cultural pre-disposition or R&D network access and cross-cutting linkages required to engage with S&T, or to assess and manage S&T issues effectively.

Power, Profits, and International Policy

Even if diplomats and their institutions were better equipped, the perspectives and interests of those in the public sector, business, the NGO community and universities are not always complimentary. Often they are contradictory or competitive.

Consider, for instance:

• The preponderance of private sector control over essential S&T intellectual property (patents and copyrights limit spread of innovation and the transfer of technology)
• The influence of what President  Eisenhower described as the Military Industrial Complex over funding priorities and research agendas  (many governments are still spending more on defence  research than on health research)
• The militarization of international policy more generally (development and diplomacy have been sidelined by the use of armed force as the international policy instrument of choice)

These observations provide some idea of the scope and dimensions of the challenge. Yet the connections and trade-offs between defence spending and underdevelopment, S&T and international policy, or the public good and private interests are not on the radar screen of most analysts or governments.

If this is to change, and in order to examine the remedial possibilities, opinion leaders, decision-makers and senior officials must be critically aware of the dynamic inter-relationships among and between principal actors and the key questions and issues at play.

Unfortunately, most are not. In fact, these matters are seldom on the political map. The implications for both Canada and the world are significant, and these will be the subject of the next post.