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
Guerrilla Diplomacy:  
Rethinking  
International Relations

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ISBNs: 978-1-58826-679-8 hc

978-1-58826-655-2 pb



LYNNE RIENNER PUBLISHERS

1800 30th Street, Ste. 314

Boulder, CO 80301

USA

telephone 303.444.6684

fax 303.444.0824

This excerpt was downloaded from the  
Lynne Rienner Publishers website  
[www.rienner.com](http://www.rienner.com)

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# Diplomacy, Development, and Security in the Age of Globalization

# 1

*It is impossible for words to describe what is necessary.*  
—Colonel Walter E. Kurtz in  
Francis Ford Coppola's *Apocalypse Now*

**It's a jungle out there. Even Joseph Conrad, whose novel *Heart of Darkness* provided the basis for Coppola's film, would have been awestruck to discover just how far up the river, as it were, the world now finds itself. Pick up a newspaper, turn on the television, or log on to your favorite political website or e-zine. The big stories, from political violence to religious extremism, transnational market meltdowns to weapons of mass destruction, pandemic disease to climate change, all point to the conclusion that the human project is facing major challenges.**

Headlines, of course, don't tell the whole story. Now as always, a good deal of what matters takes place *behind* the headlines, sometimes in the little-known habitat of diplomats. But increasingly, the things that count are happening in the open, in the public domain. Breaking events are reported and broadcast, often by citizen journalists using the new digital media. Nowhere are these changes more clearly evident or important than in the case of international relations.

Today, world affairs are less a matter of conducting official business between states than of managing the effects of the colossal force widely known as globalization, a powerful engine of integration. Paradoxically, it can also generate insecurity, splinter politics, and enlarge cultural divides.

With the economic crisis that began in mid-2008, globalization may be down, but it is far from out. Indeed, its persistence continues to render the planet and its problems, and hence the challenges facing diplomacy, immensely more complex. A new range of issues rooted in science and driven by technology must increasingly become the focus of the diplomatic enterprise. Multiple threats to global order, which are at least as likely to stem from the activities of supranational or intranational collectivities as they are from the machinations of traditional nation-states, have rendered the peaceful administration of the international system increasingly difficult.

In our wired world, security has become indivisible and diplomacy, dedicated by definition to solving problems and resolving differences without the use of force, matters. Each year many more die from poverty-related causes than are killed as a result of any kind of political or religious violence. By addressing issues of underdevelopment, which only fifty years ago were all but ignored, agents of diplomacy can play a critical role in the achievement of international security. But diplomacy is a neglected, almost obscure subject within contemporary academic research, and its practice has not been adapted to the transformed environment in which it must operate. Not only has it lost its monopoly on intergovernmental communications across borders, but a panoply of thorny challenges, most related to globalization, have either gone unaddressed or have been dealt with by other means, mainly military. The results have been dismal.

Understanding the volatile alchemy of underdevelopment and insecurity, assessing the crisis of diplomacy, bridging the diplomatic performance gap, and identifying ways to transform diplomats into globalization managers are the goals of this book. Yet no one size fits all. I offer no single-factor explanations or sole-source solutions, instead contributing to the debate by synthesizing and encapsulating sets of complex interrelationships under the rubrics of public and, especially, *guerrilla diplomacy*.

\* \* \*

*The Book of One Thousand and One Nights* tells the instructive tale of a one-time king of Persia. Betrayed by his first wife, the king neither trusted nor respected any possible successor; each day he would choose a virgin, marry her, and have her beheaded the following morning.

One day the king encountered the vizier's cunning and beautiful daughter, Scheherazade, who, against her father's wishes volunteered to spend a night with the king. Sizing up her predicament, Scheherazade used her knowledge, intellect, and imagination to tell stories of Ali Baba, Sinbad, and Aladdin, among others, until the king was won over by satisfaction and gratitude. He sent the executioner home. Scheherazade was granted full pardon; they were wed and had three sons.

Moral of the story? *Keep talking*. That is the message that diplomacy brings to the world of international relations.

### **Twenty-First-Century Alchemy**

Development and security are worthy ends; diplomacy and defense, like trade, immigration, and international law, are available means. History illustrates that diplomacy can be crucial to the prevention and, more commonly, to the resolution of conflict. Much less widely appreciated is the fact that diplomacy can

also make a durable contribution to international security at much lower cost than can armed force, namely by addressing not only the immediate causes of organized violence—anger, resentment, humiliation—but also the underlying, structurally embedded ones. Even with absolute poverty diminishing in places, relative disparity and the popular discontent it creates are becoming more acute.

Diplomacy can be used to address and ultimately manage these discontinuities, tensions, and imbalances. Diplomats, however, are languishing in the bleachers as the legions march by.

When the Soviet Union imploded, the distinction between the first, second, and third worlds ceased being either accurate or relevant. Since then, analysts have been without a world order model that effectively captures globalization. To better identify and understand the emerging contours of the twenty-first century, a better framework is required—one that will distinguish among those whose prospects are improving, those whose dispositions will be contingent upon future developments, those whose well-being is at risk, and those who are excluded.

Almost twenty years have passed since the end of the Cold War, yet the Manichean, radically simplistic worldview of the Cold Warriors remains. Among major powers, foreign policy remains to a great extent militarized and may become even more so. The Cold War habit of binary perception—whereby everything is seen in terms of good or bad, friend or foe, black or white—as well as that of threatening and brandishing hard power haunts us still. The domestic politics of fear and the ubiquitously advertised danger of terrorism have obscured a larger truth, namely that it is people, not countries or politics or ideas, that constitute the foundation upon which all else rests.

I propose a solution: the acceptance of human-centered development, whereby the well-being of people is paramount as the basis for a new international policy upon which the world can construct a new kind of security. Achieving this goal will require moving well beyond discredited notions of “modernization.” Much greater focus is needed on scientific research and the development of new technologies, as well as on the balance between human and environmental needs. If scientific discovery is the fuel of globalization, then technological innovation is its motor. Special attention will have to be devoted to finding ways to better connect diplomacy to the research and development (R&D) agenda in support, for example, of the health of the ecosphere—without compromising the present or future requirements of economic development, social progress, or justice. Growth must proceed, yes, but it must be of an intelligent and informed variety, rather than the reckless, speculative greed and fear fest that has recently wrought such havoc. I propose a holistic, sustainable ethic of development as the defining characteristic not just of aid programs but of diplomacy and international security as a whole.

An important implication of this argument, with consequences for spending priorities and the distribution of resources, is that we must rethink

the nature of diplomacy, which has been driven in all kinds of new directions by globalization. Traditional diplomacy, predicated on the conduct of formal relations between states, is in disarray. It is equipped neither to address the complex challenges of the twenty-first century nor to deliver the kinds of remedial policies that the era of globalization requires. The growing number of unresolved transnational issues and the increasing incidence of violence and conflict in the world attest to diplomacy's failure. In the face of the new constellation of unconventional, irregular threats—from explosive devices to pandemic diseases—international policy planners and diplomatic practitioners need to innovate rigorously and to adopt irregular responses. Technology, for example, can create economic opportunities and solve problems, but it can also intensify alienation and spread disaffection. Bridging the R&D gaps that divide the beneficiaries of globalization from those consigned to its underside or lost on the periphery requires specialized knowledge. Many diplomats, however, especially those in senior positions, are saddled with outdated skills and rigid sensibilities acquired during the Cold War. They are without the flexibility to combine a nuanced understanding of the political economy of knowledge with its strategic application.

Diplomats, as they have traditionally been trained and developed, are particularly ill prepared to diagnose or treat the growing range of political, economic, and, especially, science-based global problems that have become a prominent feature of the evolving international landscape. Like the bases for the new security, the diplomat, too, must be reimagined. Class, pedigree, and social status, once among the defining elements of the trade, have been eclipsed by personal and professional skills not easily acquired at Ivy League schools. These new skills are central to what I call guerrilla diplomacy.

Our response to globalization will have implications for all elements of the diplomatic ecosystem—including, among many constituent elements, the principal structures and institutions of international policy: diplomacy, the foreign ministry, and foreign service. The three are inextricably intermeshed and best treated organically. All require major reform and reconstruction. To understand the *ecology of diplomacy*—which is to say the interlocking relationship among diplomatic methods, agents, and institutions—it is necessary to operate unconventionally, outside the usual scholarly confines of data sets and exclusive theoretical frameworks, while maintaining the vantage point necessary to survey the findings generated by many different disciplines. These largely unexplored frontiers are our destination.

### **The Diplomatic Agenda: Globalization in Context**

Globalization—the historical process that is shaping our times—carries enormous implications for diplomacy, development, security, and international policy. In the context of globalization, none of the latter are usefully viewed in

isolation. New actors drawn from civil society, tribal and religious groups, supranational bodies, and the private sector now play major roles distinct from those of governments. A different constellation of challenges and threats has emerged, in tandem with multiplying media and unexplored possibilities.

Old-style, state-to-state relations, with all of their associated conventions and rigidities, remain in the diplomatic mix, but as the center of gravity has shifted, their relevance has diminished. The erstwhile global village has come to resemble something more akin to a corporation of gated communities surrounded on all sides by sprawling, seething shantytowns. As a result, diplomacy, too, has dispersed: the front lines are frequently far from the chancellery. The encounters that matter often occur in dangerous and faraway places and the issues are almost unimaginably complex.

Unlike some, I do not glamorize globalization—but neither do I dismiss it, as has lately become fashionable.<sup>1</sup> Instead, I maintain that the central task of analysts is to grapple with its manifold and continuing implications.<sup>2</sup> Where these are negative, the development of remedial strategies will be required.

Although driven primarily by economic forces, globalization often conditions and sometimes determines outcomes across an expansive array of human activities. Thus it has produced a very mixed picture, featuring both winners and losers, beneficiaries and victims—providing comfort and choice for some, misery and hardship for many. Globalization is nothing if not complex and paradoxical. Even where levels of absolute poverty and deprivation are diminishing, the relative gaps—and the media-fueled perceptions thereof—are at all levels increasing, while the spaces left for shared goals and common identity are shrinking.<sup>3</sup> Notions of difference—ethnic, religious, cultural, and political—rather than similarity, are ascendant everywhere. These are particularly manifest in the many expressions of political Islam.

One of the most interesting but frequently overlooked aspects of globalization is its tendency to deterritorialize social, economic, and political spaces.<sup>4</sup> While not happening at the same pace or intensity everywhere, time and distance, as barriers to human interaction and exchange, are disappearing; shared identity and a sense of community are no longer dependent upon physical proximity. The advent of the Internet and wireless communications has made possible the creation and extension of virtual communities—jihadis among them—but also widely dispersed and numerous groupings of overseas Chinese, South and Southeast Asians, African tribes and clans, and many others. This carries largely unexamined implications not only for national and international security but also for the potential for enlisting the aid of newcomers in the project of nation building.

While globalization compresses geographic space, the connectedness that it engenders expands the possibilities for contact and cooperation. Diplomats need to learn how to operate in these amorphous horizontal spaces, but at present diplomats are more attuned to and adept at working in the familiar vertical



mosaic of the apparatus of the state, where official designations and hierarchic social relations are the norm.

The combination of exploitation and inequality with a sharpened awareness thereof has created fertile ground for extremist causes, especially religious ones. In the globalizing world, more people have more access to more information, much of it visual as well as textual. In these circumstances, perceptions of growing inequality and inequity, however relative, become both sharper and more widely held. The ever-expanding use of information and communications technology has encouraged intense feelings of exploitation and suffering to become vicarious.<sup>5</sup> And it is that destabilizing development which brings concerns about addressing its underlying causes front and center.

Shifting precariously, the globalized world is at the same time monolithic and fractured. If it had a texture, it would be uneven. By imposing the ethos of competitiveness and polarizing the creation and distribution of wealth, resources, and opportunities both within and among states, globalization aggregates at some levels as it fragments at others. By expanding markets for goods and ideas and extending networks, globalization enlarges the scope for democratization even as it cheapens its content and corrodes the broad cultural base upon which democracy depends, in part through the promotion of values originating in the metropolitan center. By disseminating vast quantities of information, it undermines monopolies previously enjoyed by governments and corporations, while it concentrates and reinforces the power of a smaller number of key players ranging from international financial institutions and celebrities to private charities and philanthropic organizations. By subverting repressive, authoritarian structures, it contributes to political liberation, even as its tendency to sharpen economic inequalities undermines the delicate social contract upon which all representative institutions ultimately depend.

Globalization generates wealth, but not for all. It churns out ever cheaper consumer goods, at least for those who can afford them. It contributes to capital accumulation but also to instability by inflating speculative bubbles and then bursting them. Highly prone to serious disruption, it creates efficiencies but breeds insecurity, particularly in the volatile zones found between integrating cores—OECD countries and other beneficiaries of globalization—and disintegrating peripheries, where the standard of living is declining. These zones are sometimes referred to collectively as “the gap.”<sup>6</sup> Globalization, whatever its virtues, has become a primary source of disaffection and, as it weakens the machinery of government while exacerbating inequity, a major contributor to state failure. Weak states seem to be multiplying; according to the World Bank, the number of fragile states has grown recently from seventeen to twenty-six in only three years.<sup>7</sup>

These powerful currents are responsible for much of the violence of our times. Today, the animus of most conflict originates not in the kinds of proximate political, ideological, and territorial differences that have traditionally

given rise to interstate warfare. Rather, the causes are rooted in the essential dynamic of globalization, which generates threats of a sort best addressed not by counterinsurgency or a so-called war on terror,<sup>8</sup> but instead, I believe, by agents of diplomacy in the strategic pursuit of equitable, sustainable, and human-centered development.<sup>9</sup>

### International Policy and the “New Security”

Searching for good, or at least better, governance in a world faced with deteriorating international relations, severe economic instability, a worsening physical environment, and grinding, systemic violence (especially prevalent where chronic poverty and underdevelopment exist) is stimulating to some, wearying to others. There is, however, one overriding objective shared by all: an interest in survival. However basic, this connection could usefully be built upon.

During the Cold War, the management of interstate relations was the centerpiece of international relations. Globalization, however, has brought transnational issues to the forefront and has made security and development mutually inclusive and indivisible—two sides of the same coin fused by diplomacy and international policy.

This fusion is unprecedented, yet the magnitude and complexity of the impact have tended to induce a sense of powerlessness, hopelessness, and anesthesia, particularly at the level of the lowest common denominator. This apathy must be resisted, especially by those responsible for the framing of international policy, who face steep challenges as a result of globalization’s winnowing effects. The delicate balance between the promotion of values such as human rights, democracy, religious freedom, and social justice and the pursuit of interests such as trade gains, capital inflows, commercial advantages, and resource access has become even harder to achieve.

Finding this balance is the province of *international policy*, a term I use broadly to describe most everything that national governments officially do outside of their borders. It refers to activities undertaken by a variety of departments, agencies, and institutions—for example, trade and investment promotion, immigration, development assistance, military intervention, and environmental action. Partners (or targets or adversaries) may include other levels of government or nonstate actors. The term stands in contrast to an older and more familiar term, *foreign policy*, which was transacted almost exclusively between states and was primarily the domain of foreign ministries and heads of state or government. This terminological evolution reflects both the blurring of the lines between the domestic and international spheres and the shift from the Cold War era that of globalization. It is also suggestive of the reality among many countries that diplomatic missions abroad are staffed by representatives from a variety of central government departments, and sometimes by representatives from other levels of government and civil society as well.

Development and security are key international policy objectives, and I view them as inseparable. Both feature prominently in the thinking on human-centered development, which is premised on freedom of political, economic, social, and cultural expression; the provision of reasonable access to the basic necessities of life, both material and knowledge-based; and the absence of chronic threats. Action to address the causes of fear and want—a central pillar of what has come to be known as the *human security doctrine*—is considered germane to human-centered development.<sup>10</sup>

Within this rubric, I have tried to synthesize one especially critical cluster of issues surrounding the opportunity to access and use the burgeoning political economy of knowledge. Developing this capacity will involve harnessing the power of science and technology to bridge strategic R&D gaps both within and among populations, countries, and regions. Not least because of their present state of neglect in the realm of international policy, recognition of the pivotal role of science and technology in international relations and in the achievement of human-centered development is essential for fashioning a better, more secure tomorrow.

In terms of real threats to humankind, terrorism does not make the A list. It is in a different league than climate change, pandemic disease, the scourge of chronic underdevelopment, and, for that matter, such problems as transportation safety and the explosive growth of tobacco use in underdeveloped countries. Nonetheless, the placement of counterterrorism at or near the very center of the foreign policy frameworks adopted by many Western countries since 9/11, secured by the fear-mongering of the mass media, renders the treatment of such issues indispensable to this analysis. Though not a panacea, a thoroughly reconstructed approach to diplomacy, at present significantly undervalued and underresourced, will be crucial in mobilizing the support necessary to achieve global development and security over the longer term. In the meantime, however, a world in which suicide bombing has become commonplace, fundamentalist Islam has been branded as the religion of the oppressed, and terror has been embraced as the weapon of choice by the weak and the disenfranchised desperately requires innovative response. Diplomats, as I will show, can add value here too, not least in conflict situations, using methods not available to soldiers, aid workers, or the representatives of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs).

### **Diplomatic Deconstruction**

If international relations address the *why* in the assessment offered here, and international policy the *what*, then diplomacy is about the *how*. As understood and practiced today, diplomacy is a relatively recent addition to international relations. As part of the lexicon of statecraft, it has come into common usage only in the eighteenth century. Since then, the ends of diplomacy have not

changed: the nonviolent resolution of differences through negotiation and compromise, the promotion of cooperation for mutual gain, and the collection and analysis of information related to the advancement of national interests.<sup>11</sup> Dialogue, however, cannot flourish in the absence of a commitment to development or in a violent climate wherein large-scale insecurity is treated mainly by the application of force.

Simply put, security is no longer best understood as a dimension of defense. Instead, in this world of organized militaries pursuing irregular militants, vulnerability has become mutual, and the use of conventional arms is frequently counterproductive. To find the best route to a more pacific future, the fundamentals of security need to be rethought, and the intellectual foundations reconstructed. Only then will public diplomacy and nation branding emerge as vital instruments.

At the highest level of analysis, public diplomacy involves efforts by governments to promote their policies and interests abroad by influencing international public opinion through interaction with other polities, forging partnerships with civil societies, and using the media strategically. The approach is noncoercive and based on the use of “soft power”—the attractive rather than coercive power to make others want what you want and to harness public opinion in support of particular interests.<sup>12</sup> In other words, public diplomats use the tools and tactics of public relations to connect with populations abroad, and they count on that connection to produce intelligence and to move host governments toward desired ends. This is very different from classic diplomatic practice.<sup>13</sup> Agents of public diplomacy and branding move the goalposts, enlarge the playing field, and rewrite the rules of the game in a manner not fully captured even in the literature that has attracted renewed attention to these subjects post-9/11.<sup>14</sup>

In liberal democracies generally, and in major cities such as London, Tokyo, New York, and São Paulo, public diplomacy works well. Globalization has produced a cultural commonality, and, especially in democracies, audiences are both accessible and influential. But the model needs to be pushed when applied to underdeveloped areas and areas of conflict and insecurity. What I call guerrilla diplomacy offers a formula for as much, particularly in response to some of the more exigent challenges posed by globalization.<sup>15</sup> In developing that concept and putting the focus on adaptability, agility, self-sufficiency, intelligence, and technology, I stress the importance of tapping into both mass and elite sources of fact and opinion. Clearly, if you are to connect with the population among whom you are operating, you must first devote a great deal of effort toward understanding deeply what your interlocutors are all about. That is precisely why some lines of thinking about public diplomacy and counterinsurgency are converging.

For this reason and others, we must also fundamentally reconsider our approach to the generation and analysis of foreign intelligence by asking ourselves

where, how, and for what purpose it is gathered and what is done with the product. I am not talking here about spying, or running agents, or any of the various forms of espionage, subversion, and skulduggery. Au contraire, in my view, among the most promising of recent developments has been the move away from an exclusive, discreet if not secretive, boutique type of diplomacy catering mainly to the tastes of the pinstripe set toward something much closer to the ideals of Main Street—something that operates at the grassroots to take diplomacy to the people. With an ear to the ground, much can be heard.

As a network builder and knowledge worker, the public diplomat, and even more so the guerrilla diplomat, becomes an agile agent with access to critical information sources, connecting directly with populations and navigating pathways of influence others can't chart or maneuver through. Boring deep into the interstices of power and operating unconventionally—often outside of their traditional metropolitan comfort zones—guerrilla diplomats can negotiate both the drivers of globalization and the consequences of change.

This kind of diplomacy is most effective when meaningful exchange is translated into policy development and action. It goes well beyond the work done by public affairs offices found in most embassies—which typically seek more to inform than to persuade—and has more in common with dialogue than propaganda, which is a one-way flow of information often characterized by inaccuracy and bias in support of a particular cause. But neither public diplomacy nor its more radical variant, guerrilla diplomacy, can work in a vacuum.<sup>16</sup> To ensure that they deliver on their full potential, we need a much larger, more comprehensive, and in many respects more complicated package of structural and institutional changes. Here we must examine critically the other two elements of the diplomatic ecosystem: the foreign ministry—and especially its role in the formulation of development policy and aid programs—and the foreign service, which is in desperate need of reform. That said, in the era of globalization it is precisely diplomacy, the foreign ministry, and the foreign service that remain the most efficient tools with which to identify and, ultimately, address the daunting range of economic, social, and political needs worldwide, and, in so doing, make the planet a more secure place.

### **Geodiplomacy: The World in Five Uneasy Pieces**

Where in the world are we going? How might we best chart where we've been, where we are, and where we would like to arrive? A reconsidered grand strategy would set out basic principles, policies, and instruments; analyze the threats and obstacles to be broached; and identify the objectives sought. Uniting them under the general heading of *geodiplomatics*, I summarize here the central issues to be treated and principal arguments to be advanced in the pages that follow.<sup>17</sup>

1. Globalization is a profound historical process that works very well for some, affording them comfort and choice—but at the direct expense of many others. Because globalization generates insecurity, its management must be moved to the top of the diplomatic agenda. To accurately apprehend the nature of that agenda and of the environment in which international policy is formulated and implemented, diplomats will need an explanatory and predictive world order model—one that takes full account of the impact of globalization, highlighting especially the dialectic between security and development.

2. As we have moved from the Cold War era to that of globalization, development has displaced defense as the most secure foundation upon which to build a common future. The range of threats and challenges generated by this epochal shift are best addressed not through armed force, a global war on terror, or the militarization of international policy<sup>18</sup>—which has resulted in a severe misallocation of resources—but through the strategic pursuit of human-centered development. Particular emphasis must be placed by diplomats on the role of communications, culture, nonstate actors, and the implications of the deterritorialization of political space.

3. Many of the key challenges for international policy in the twenty-first century—the quality of life in megacities, the existence of weapons of mass destruction, the depletion of energy supplies, pandemic disease, climate change—are fundamental to both security and development and are rooted in and driven by science and technology.<sup>19</sup> To address these issues, diplomats will need to develop new skills that reflect their understanding of the emerging political economy of knowledge. I refer to this strategic capacity to bridge R&D gaps by connecting local problems to global understanding as *souplesse*.

4. Diplomacy is not a cure-all for the ills of globalization, but compared to the alternatives—especially defense—it is an undervalued, underresourced, and cost-effective asset with which much more could be done. Public and especially guerrilla diplomacy are uniquely attuned to the challenges and threats generated by globalization. But diplomacy's structures, principles, and practices must be rethought from the ground up, with special attention dedicated to the relationship between development and security, not least in the context of counterinsurgency. If states are allowed to fail, insecurity will deepen and widen.

5. To better support a transformed international policy agenda, we must consider the machinery and institutions of diplomacy together—constituting as they do the aforementioned ecology of diplomacy—and revamp them in tandem. The foreign ministry and foreign service are not predicated upon the need to connect with populations, to construct and maintain networks of contacts, or to generate the intelligence required to understand and deal effectively with complex, crosscutting issues. If institutional performance in the pursuit of peace and prosperity is to be improved, the entire diplomatic ecosystem must be restored.

Diplomacy matters, but it is in crisis because it has not adapted to globalization, it lacks a functioning world order model, and it is in large part divorced from development as well as science and technology. It is, in short, in need of a systemic makeover. The challenges are great. But the potential for progress is greater still. The Internet—the flagship of globalization—is both changing diplomatic practice and empowering individual diplomats by giving them access to a vast amount of knowledge and the ability to communicate to a worldwide audience. Even so, diplomats will need new tools, both heuristic and practical, if they are to act effectively in response to the challenges of the twenty-first century, underdevelopment foremost among them. Success will turn on both political leadership and, at the senior bureaucratic level, a determined effort to avoid further reductions and acquire new resources. In many governments, each has been notable mainly for its absence.

With so much to do, we must take time to reflect. To reconsider. To think things through. Diplomacy was largely frozen out of the Cold War, and it has been shunted to the sidelines in the global war on terror. Government spokespeople are fond of saying they “don’t negotiate” with the Taliban, militants, Al-Qaida, extremists, terrorists, and so on. That must change. Communication in itself is neutral. To engage in it is not necessarily to support or in any way condone the actions of the other party to the exchange.

War is the antithesis of diplomacy, and reliance upon armed force as the international policy instrument of choice is costly. When the fighting starts, the negotiations intended to avert recourse to violence stop. Diplomacy may continue, or resume, but for purposes of conflict resolution rather than prevention. The willingness to compromise wanes, especially on the part of the side that’s winning. The scope of useful diplomatic enterprise becomes limited. Yet as a tool used to treat the afflictions characteristic of globalization, the military is both too sharp, which is to say damaging, and too dull, which is to say imprecise. When states lead with the sword, they forfeit the predisposition to grapple with complex differences through meaningful political communication. That is guerrilla diplomacy’s forte.

Amid the din of plowshares being beaten into swords, I believe that it is time to commit to talking, not fighting. The next twelve chapters explain why and how. But getting from here to there will involve formulating the right questions at least as much as proffering any answers.

### **A Thumbnail Sketch of This Book**

Part 1, *The Evolving Context of Diplomacy*, lays the conceptual and historical foundations necessary for understanding the shift from the freeze that characterized the Cold War period to the flux so evident in the era of globalization—a transition upon which the rest of the volume is constructed. Chapter 2, *Cold*

War Comfort, offers a survey of the profoundly changed environment in which international policy is being planned and executed in the postmillennium. In Chapter 3, *Globalization and Empire*, I examine some of the essential cross-currents generated by the shift from the Cold War to the age of globalization and identify those elements that are consequential for diplomacy. Chapter 4, *Understanding World Order*, pulls together some of the principal strands of the ragged transition and weaves them into a new cloth, in part using thread provided by dependency theorists. My emphasis here is on the interactions at all levels among an integrating core, a vast disintegrating periphery, and those who find themselves in the interstices.

Part 2, *Drivers of Change*, moves to an intermediate level of analysis at which I consider issues of security, including its relationship to development, and the impact advances in science and technology have had on it. In Chapter 5, *Persistent Insecurity*, I make the case that the prospect of equitable, sustainable, human-centered development—as opposed, for instance, to power balancing, deterrence, or the war on terror—represents the only durable basis for international security. On that premise, I examine the ideological and strategic baggage carried over from the Cold War past—as well as the luggage that was, perhaps mistakenly, left behind. Chapter 6, *Development Revisited*, compares conceptions of development and evaluates the record of progress to date. In Chapter 7, *Science and Technology*, I explore a vital but rarely assessed characteristic of globalization: the rising significance of science and technology as a component of international policy. Much more than terrorism or religious extremism, I argue, the challenges rooted in science and driven by technology—from climate change to pandemic disease—threaten human survival. That these generators of epochal change are frequently overlooked or understated by analysts, or ineptly managed by policymakers, may be attributed to their near-complete absence in the contemporary diplomatic mix.

In Part 3, *Diplomacy Unbound*, we shift from an analysis of past and present trends in international relations to a consideration of the future and the ways in which we can prepare for what may be in store. Here I move from the poetry to the plumbing, zooming in on issues and institutions (the foreign ministry, the foreign service, and the diplomatic business model) that constitute the core of diplomacy's ecosystem and analyzing how states and their representatives might best equip themselves to respond to the challenges of globalization—professionally, organizationally, and administratively. Chapter 8, *The Global Political Economy of Knowledge*, examines the potential use of science and technology by diplomats in bridging the digital divide that maps onto the global development gap. In Chapter 9, *The Foreign Ministry*, I review the myriad bureaucratic challenges facing diplomacy, the range of problems and preoccupations that confront international policy managers, and some of the responses attempted to date. I propose that a reformed foreign ministry, one



attuned to the uncertainty engendered by the flux of globalization, is the sole body capable of integrating action and making sense of it all. But success will require a commitment to administrative and cultural transformation; we must refashion the foreign ministry from a formulator of narrow foreign policy and a manager of interstate relations into an international policy *entrepôt* and a nation's storyteller and interpreter, addressing both domestic and international audiences. In the final chapter in this section, Public Diplomacy and Foreign Service, I inquire as to how diplomatic practitioners' methods, skill sets, and professional organizations might be realigned to address the requirements of the twenty-first century.

Part 4, *The Way Ahead*, considers the future of diplomacy and its institutions and integrates many of the main arguments and themes presented earlier in the volume around the consideration of guerrilla diplomacy. In Chapter 11, *International Policy Instruments*, I propose a mantra—*relevance, effectiveness, transformation*—for the reinvention of the foreign ministry, diplomacy, and the foreign service. I also assess the possible costs of coasting for too long on a seriously outdated image and reputation. Could branding assist policymakers in limiting the vulnerabilities associated with a growing credibility gap? Chapter 12, *Guerrilla Diplomacy*, etches a portrait of the diplomat as guerrilla that reveals his or her personal qualities, use of technology and intelligence, and role in the management of counterinsurgency. The guerrilla diplomat is above all effective—swimming like a fish in the sea of the people, making and maintaining networks of contacts, communicating politically, mastering new media, and generating both tactical and strategic advantage. I argue that guerrilla diplomats, as a key subset of public diplomats, are uniquely suited for dealing with the contemporary constellation of security threats. They are equipped to address feelings of resentment, humiliation, alienation, anger, and fear in ways the old Westphalian school of diplomats could not begin to contemplate. By taking them from hearing to listening, from looking to seeing, and, even more important, from transmission to reception and from broadcast to exchange, guerrilla diplomacy allows its practitioners to build relationships on the basis of critical personal and situational elements—confidence, trust, and respect—rather than positional power.

In the concluding chapter, I summarize the principal findings that have emerged from the research, analysis, and personal experience that inform this book, and I also indicate some areas of possible future scholarly interest. The volume wraps up with a discussion of five abiding paradoxes associated with globalization and international policy, suggesting some implications and possible options for policymakers.

The upshot? In the age of globalization, security, development, and world order have become inseparable, and diplomacy is the key to treating the new range of threats and challenges rooted in science and driven by technology. Better performance with respect to shaping our common future won't take a

miracle, but it will require an accurate understanding of the world we live in, the will to learn new skills, and a commitment to realign grand strategy and address global priorities. In that calculation, diplomacy, rather than defense, must occupy a central place, for it has the crosscutting applicability all other international policy instruments lack. Public and especially guerrilla diplomacy can restore the relevance and effectiveness of the world's second oldest profession in the face of the threats and challenges globalization presents. First, however, we will have to find ways to correct the crippling imbalance between the exploding demand and diminishing supply of all forms of diplomacy in an insecure world. A substantial reallocation or injection of new resources is a *sine qua non*.

## Notes

1. Thomas Friedman (1999; 2005) has been perhaps foremost among the cheerleaders. For a positive institutional perspective, see assessments prepared by the IMF. For the other end of the spectrum see, for instance, John Ralston Saul (2005). The onset of economic crisis in mid-2008 has produced many obituaries attesting to the end of globalization; I believe them premature.

2. In seeking ways to find virtue in necessity, or, at minimum, to make the most of a very daunting set of circumstances, see Stiglitz (2002 and, especially, 2006). His transformation from the voice of orthodoxy as chief economist for the World Bank to a darling of the global justice movement has been epic.

3. See World Bank (2005b: 55–69).

4. See Scholte (2005). This might also be termed *denationalization* and is related as well to the reduced regulatory and mediating power of states.

5. What motivates those young Muslims, Sikhs, Jews, Hindus, Christians, and others to turn to violence to express their disaffection? Some commentators emphasize that those who become attracted to terrorism or radicalism are often relatively well-to-do members of the working and middle classes or citizens of middle-income or wealthy countries. I find that unsurprising. You don't have to have lung cancer to get upset about the efforts of tobacco companies to develop new markets, you don't have to have been hit by someone under the influence to be an advocate for stronger drunk-driving laws, and you don't have to be suffering personally from structural violence and systemic injustice to feel empathy for the victims, especially if it appears that members of your ethnic or religious group are being afflicted disproportionately.

6. See Barnett (2003; 2004). The 2003 reference appeared in *Esquire* and is a preliminary encapsulation of the book's more fully developed thesis.

7. On the increasing number of fragile states, or "low-income countries under stress," see World Bank (2006). Vinod Thomas, principal author of the Bank's report on this subject, notes: "Neglecting the fragile states—home to 500 million people, half of whom are living in extreme poverty—risks worsening their misery, in turn feeding regional and global instability." For an introduction to some of the many issues and competing assessments associated with state failure, see Zartman (1995), Rotberg (2003), Chesterman (2005), and Chomsky (2006).

8. The war on terror has been justified by what has been coined the Bush Doctrine of preemption, unilateralism, and military preeminence. See White House (2002; 2006). The approach codified in these documents was developed mainly by a loose alliance of neoconservatives exiled from the center of power during the Clinton years. Founded in

1997 by William Kristol and Robert Kagan, this group, which came together as the Project for a New American Century, advocated a defense buildup, a confrontational foreign policy, and the aggressive promotion of their version of liberty and democracy. Its members, including Dick Cheney, Donald Rumsfeld, Paul Wolfowitz, Richard Perle, Richard Armitage, Lewis “Scooter” Libby, and Jeb Bush, were especially prominent in high places during George Bush’s first term. See <http://www.newamericancentury.org>.

9. See the World Commission on Environment and Development (1987).

10. The main lines of the human security doctrine are set out in the UN Development Programme’s Human Development Report 1994, which fuses conceptions of development with those of security. Since the report’s release, interpretations have become so broad that the concept has lost much of its precision, permitting its appropriation by the proponents of the use of armed force as the favored international policy instrument. In important respects, NATO’s intervention in Bosnia and Kosovo, including its so-called human security bombing of Belgrade, has served to keep the militarization of international policy acceptable and has opened the door for subsequent interventions. I have accordingly tried to minimize my use of the term.

11. Surely one of the more curious aspects of diplomacy is that so few of its practitioners can actually define the term—or even think much about its meaning.

12. See Nye (1990; 2004b).

13. See, for instance, Nicolson (1980). For a historical perspective, see Anderson (1993) as well as Hamilton and Langhorne (1995). On diplomatic theory, see Berridge (2005). The classic vocational text is Ernest Satow’s *Guide to Diplomatic Practice* (1979). A more contemporary perspective is offered by Barston (2006). See also Bull (1977) for the so-called English School’s assessment of the role of diplomacy in international relations, Marshall (1999) for a practical guide, Freeman (1997) on tools of statecraft.

14. See Jönsson and Hall (2005).

15. See Copeland (2004: 165–175).

16. Public diplomacy or, to put it more broadly, the new diplomacy emphasizes the need to move beyond the idea of conducting traditional state-to-state relations through designated channels like foreign ministries and envoys toward that of connecting directly with populations. For an assessment of what this might mean for Canadian foreign relations, see Copeland (2005).

17. The term *geodiplomatics* was coined jointly by former British diplomat Sir Peter Marshall and Nabil Ayad, director of the Diplomatic Academy of London at the University of Westminster. It is used in the same global and strategic sense as *geopolitics* or *geoconomics*, often in the context of image projection and reputation management. Professor Ayad and I agreed to the definition of geodiplomacy as “the effective management of the global strategic nexus.” Personal communication with the author, January 18, 2008.

18. For a broad treatment of this theme in the US context, see Herr (2008).

19. Since 2004, there has been some controversy concerning which of these issues is most pressing and whether a preoccupation with one (such as climate change) might come at the expense of attention to another (for example, the AIDS pandemic). See, for instance, Lomborg (2007). My point, however, is that all of these challenges share a common source in science and technology.