Last month the Canadian International Council released its report, Open Canada, on possible new directions for Canadian foreign policy. There is much to commend about this easily-digested document, not least the fact that at a critical moment a group of thoughtful Canadians took the time and effort required to bring the ambitious project to completion within a very short time frame.

My observations are directed at the content in Chapter 2, entitled Multilateralism: The Revolution. That section contains most of the authors’ commentary related to diplomacy in an interdependent, connected and network-centric world.

Not all of the material presented in the chapter is revolutionary, and indeed much of what does appear has been seen in one form or another elsewhere. Consider, for example, suggestions that:

• The G20  is eclipsing the G8
• Scope exists for  the establishment of  joint-venture partnerships between government and universities, think tanks, and civil society
• After a prolonged absence, Canada should revisit the merits of engagement in 21^st century peacekeeping operations
• A specialized civil-military, rapid deployment force could be created and headquartered at DFAIT for use in fragile state stabilization missions
• Underinvestment in international education has created opportunities for increased activity in scholarships, global and language studies and the establishment of overseas campuses by Canadian universities

While there is no harm in re-floating sensible ideas, the section’s more powerful appeal is found at a higher level of analysis.

For example, most of the other chapter titles in Open Canada reflect the set of existing priorities which are being used to define this country’s global interests – the USA, Western Hemisphere, Asia, the Arctic, prosperity, defence and security. Multilateralism, however, does not figure centrally or explicitly on the government’s list, the ongoing Canadian campaign for a UN Security Council seat notwithstanding. As an international policy instrument,  multilateralism  has lately taken a back seat to defence and trade.  Reference to diplomacy, which the authors of Open Canada tend to use almost synonymously with multilateralism, is similarly absent in most official strategy. That’s why the elevation multilateralism – a.k.a. diplomacy – to a core list of recommended activities is encouraging.

Equally interesting is decision of the authors to frame and conceptualize their discussion of a failing states strategy under the rubric of multilateralism rather than defence and security. Inherent in that choice is a conviction that failing states are best treated with non-military tools, diplomacy and development foremost amongst them.

That, too, is laudable, and dovetails well with a conclusion that I have advanced elsewhere, namely that public diplomacy rather than aggressive war-fighting should have a central place in counterinsurgency.

The authors also raise the idea of knowledge diplomacy. Were failing states to become a focus for Canadian international policy post-Afghanistan, then the capacity to deliver that form of representation would have to be honed and reinforced considerably. The report highlights the importance of knowledge diplomacy in areas such as energy; multicultural diversity; water; democratic development, and; international education,  but it is hard to imagine real progress on these files under prevailing circumstances. To improve performance and produce results, significant change and reform would be required.

Here I am thinking about the need to afford Canadian foreign service officers substantially greater room to manoeuvre in order to permit complex and difficult problems to be resolved adroitly. Simply identifying the objectives is not enough. Canadian representatives must be vested with the confidence, trust and respect necessary not only to tap quickly and effectively into the global political economy of knowledge, but then to bring the results to bear in a timely fashion and with maximum effect in the field.

Multiple layers of oversight and endless consultation with superiors and headquarters would not be the business model of choice for knowledge diplomats.

The implicit need to transform diplomatic structures, culture and technique without lapsing into maudlin recollections about some “Golden Age” is arguably a major element of Chapter 2. If that observation is pushed just a bit, one could interpret a related requirement to create an institution capable of supporting innovative policy-making and enlightened diplomatic practice.  Preferably, this project would be undertaken outside of the foreign ministry, where the generation of new thinking sometimes takes a back seat to career and political considerations.

A stand alone entity dedicated to the exploration and articulation of diplomatic alternatives – and alternative diplomacy - would not suffer from the diffuse objectives, diverse taskings and vexing administrative overheads of a government department. Such an enterprise would be staffed by experts recruited inter-sectorally, and could perhaps function along the lines of a skunk works, not unlike the sort usually associated with the high technology industry. This would mean the adopting, and living by values such as flexibility, adaptability, teamwork, continuous learning, and risk tolerance.  The use of new media and virtual networks would figure centrally.

The establishment of a cross-cutting, public-private and independent network node for the promotion of diplomacy would both burnish the Canadian brand and serve as a concrete expression of this country’s comparative advantage internationally. By way of charter and mandate, a whole-of-government, whole-of-Canada Institute for Diplomatic Alternatives (or Alternative Diplomacy…?) could:

• develop innovative diplomatic strategy and tactics
• identify and advocate approaches and solutions to global issues and problems
• generate creative ideas on crisis remediation and conflict resolution
• conduct research and analysis, develop policy, provide advice
• undertake continuous outreach to journalists, attentive publics and opinion leaders
• engage strategic partners on all sides of key issues
• produce events (conferences, symposia, round tables)
• edit and publish an e-journal of alternative diplomacy
• prepare reports, op-eds and commentary
• design and deliver training and professional development programs

The management of international relations non-violently, through dialogue, negotiation and compromise, is a worthy end deserving of additional means. To get to the “multilateral revolution” which the authors of Open Canada plainly seek, those considering the recommendations in Chapter 2 might usefully think about, but also well beyond, the existing range of options.

Contemplating the merits of a distinctively Canadian Institute for Diplomatic Alternatives seems a good place to start.

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With the G8/G20 meetings about to begin, the attention of the international media will inevitably, if fleetingly, focus on Canada. What kind of impression might be conveyed?

For journalists prepared to eschew the backdrops, sound bites and briefing books and to venture beyond the sterile secure areas, there may be a few surprises.

Even the least intrepid would soon discover that in a world of well-established, pre-packaged national identities, this country is different.

That difference has little to do with beavers or moose, with the cold climate or the scenic attractions.

It is not the place. It’s the people.

No matter where you’re from, if Canada were a mirror, you would see your own face reflected.

And because everyone is here, no one stands out.

* * * * * * * * *

It is one thing to remark upon Canadian multiculturalism, but it is quite another to think through the larger implications. Immigration, buttressed by trade, travel, tourism and technology, has transformed Canada from a marginal remnant of rival empires into an open-ended possibility, a work in progress in which change and accommodation are constant.

After almost 150 years, Canada has become a state – of becoming.

* * * * * * * * *

There is something inherently exciting about looking forward rather than gazing back. Yet for some, and perhaps especially those with a lingering attachment to the notion of a bi-lingual, bi-cultural, “true north strong and free”, being part of an ongoing demographic experiment may seem a little unsettling. Be that as it may, the old verities, however comfortable, no longer fit.

It’s not just that over one half of Toronto residents, for instance, were born somewhere else. Recent public opinion research also suggests that coasting on an outdated reputation has begun to erode Canada’s credibility abroad. It is time to move on – or face the consequences.

That said, the risks of inaction pale in comparison to the possible gains on the upside. If some innovative thinking were harnessed in service of Canadian objectives in the high stakes world of international affairs, a coherent effort to project a more contemporary mix could pay handsome dividends.

Many countries have the coercive power associated with armed force, but that will never be Canada’s strong suit. Nor should it be. This country’s comparative advantage lies elsewhere – in the diverse make-up of its communities, in the souplesse of the social fabric, in an unthreatening demeanour and a willingness to be helpful.

In terms of trade and investment, this country has among its citizens people with the language skills, cross-cultural acumen and business savvy necessary to penetrate promising new markets of any description.

When it comes to the complex balancing and knowledge-based, problem solving skills required for mediation, negotiation and compromise in conflict resolution, Canada is similarly well-equipped.

With a generally benign image, little historical baggage and an open, approachable temperament, the prospects for successful engagement in genuine dialogue improve.

In other words, because the idea of Canada usually evokes a smile rather than a scowl, people will talk to us.

The same positive predisposition is not always displayed towards those with a colonial past or imperial present.

* * * * * * * * *

Even with a pretty good hand, however, branding a nation – which is to say, a country and its people – is immensely difficult. Nation brands are formed over time, and are best not based on postcard stereotypes.

Several years ago, the president of a leading New York PR firm screened a visually stunning slide show of mountains, lakes, forests and wheat fields at a branding seminar organized for Canadian Consuls-General in the USA.

“Canada sure looks nice, eh?” said the Madison Avenue guru.  Heads nodded sagely.

“Trouble is”, he continued,  “these are pictures of Wyoming…”

With a few exceptions – say, the Matterhorn or Percé Rock – the problem with an over-reliance on the great outdoors is that rocks and trees are largely generic.

An effective brand is not about what you look like, or say. It’s about what you do, who you are, and how you act.  That kind of brand is unique and differentiating. It conveys both emotional appeal and a clear value proposition.

Many countries rely mainly on exhortation, proclaiming support for values such as democracy and respect for human rights. When pronouncements and behaviour do not align, however, a perilous “say-do gap” can open like a yawning chasm. As more than a few major players have learned at some cost, even the best communications practices can never compensate for fundamentally flawed or contradictory policy.

Canada’s strength, and the source of such influence as might ever be exercised, emanates not from the loudness of our voice, the comeliness of our landscapes,  or the power of our weapons. Instead, this country’s appeal resides in the openness, generosity of spirit and outward orientation of Canadians.

That attraction is cultural, and it is embedded in the population rather than in politics or in public administration.

* * * * * * * * *

There has never been a coordinated, concerted attempt to construct or promote a distinctive Canadian brand; the branding potential associated with Canada’s wealth of human resources is almost completely untapped.

It is time to put the capacities and qualities of Canadians to work in the world.

To start the conversation, I would propose the elaboration of a nation branding strategy informed not by the beauty of our nature, but by the nature of our beauty. The framework could be christened Canada’s Six Cs : Creative; Competitive; Connected; Cosmopolitan; Civic, and; Caring.

These features are current. They are demonstrable. And their provenance is neither partisan nor corporate.

With vision, leadership and support as pre-requisites, the active management of Brand Canada could usefully become job one for Canadian international policy.

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What’s in a name?

In the lexicon of international relations, key terms such as  intelligence and diplomacy are often bandied about without much regard for their actual meaning.

Diplomacy is a non-violent approach to the management of international relations which features a dedication to dialogue, negotiation and compromise. Since at least the time of Chamberlain in Munich, however, diplomacy has come to be associated with weakness, appeasement, cheap talk and caving in to power.

And the diplomat? A dithering dandy lost in a haze of obsolescence somewhere between protocol and alcohol.

Intelligence, on the other hand, consists of  timely and accurate  information of vital interest to those in government on the basis of its relevance to national interests and objectives. It enjoys a generally positive, even romantic image, sustained in part by its mysterious reputation and buttressed by countless novels and films.

Contrary to the received wisdom, intelligence cannot be “good”, or “bad”, as it is often characterized in the media. A particular piece of  information is either intelligence, or it is something else – chatter, gossip, spin or dis-information. Even facts, if they are disconnected from the preoccupations of policy and decision-makers, don’t qualify.

Bottom line? Because of the ambiguity and confusion surrounding its nature and provenance, much of what passes for intelligence is anything but.

Intelligence is frequently associated with secret agents and spies. While these sorts of people may from time to time be implicated,  most intelligence comes from far less glamorous sources.

How is foreign intelligence gathered? In some instances the sources are secret – paid informers working inside a target organization, for example. Secret intelligence may also be generated using covert means, such as espionage, deception, intercepted communications or subterfuge.

None of this, however, is necessarily the case. In many instances, the most useful intelligence  is not that which is purchased or obtained clandestinely, but instead is the result of relationships which have been developed and nurtured over time on the basis of confidence, trust and respect.

That sort of information is known in the trade as humint, or human intelligence, and at its best it can be invaluable.

In a world exploding with data and commentary, raw, or unassessed material – of the sort gathered through signals intelligence, for example – is not always of great value. The most reliable interpretations tend to come instead from careful research and painstaking analysis using open sources,  and are constructed upon deep knowledge and a seasoned understanding of the issues.

In that respect, it is easy to overlook the intimate connections between intelligence, policy and diplomacy.

Foreign intelligence is about what is happening in the world. Foreign policy is about what governments would like to see happen. And diplomacy – as with other  instruments such as development assistance and armed force – is one way to make those things happen.

Serious problems arise when intelligence is made subservient to policy, as was the case when the USA went to war over Iraq’s alleged possession of weapons of mass destruction. Similar disasters occur whenever governments allow policy, or preferences, or ideology, to trump intelligence – think, for instance, of Sputnik and the so-called  “missile gap”, the failure to foresee the fall of the Shah of Iran or the attacks of 9/11 , or willful blindness in the face of an imploding Soviet Union.

On balance, the forecasting record of purpose-built intelligence agencies has been spotty, and their products have proven prone to political manipulation.

So, can intelligence be made more intelligent?

Foreign ministries and diplomats assigned abroad should play major role in the generation and assessment of foreign intelligence. Diplomats, and especially those comfortable operating “outside the bubble”,  should be spending much of their time establishing and maintaining networks of local contacts who represent a tremendous source of humint.

Public diplomats, given their outward orientation and dedication to open dialogue and meaningful exchange with civil society partners, opinion leaders, and the general population, should be particularly prodigious intelligence producers.

And guerrilla diplomats, with all of the above plus proximity to the grass roots and extreme cultural competence, might be expected to top the list.

But, here’s the rub. Foreign ministries and diplomats are, if anything, producing less intelligence than was once the case. This may be attributed to a pernicious double whammy: the absorptive and analytical capacity of foreign ministries has diminished as a result of resource reductions, while  diplomatic missions,  often saddled with functions previously the responsibility of headquarters,  are moving away from intelligence yielding activities.

Canada’s embassies and consulates, by way of illustration, are being transformed into something resembling whole-of-government points of service abroad, “international platforms” where the “client” is becoming the new point of reference. As political officers spend more and more time satisfying customers, organizing visits and preparing briefing materials, they will be hard-pressed to get out of the office, where the real representational work is done.

More bureaucracy means less diplomacy, and less diplomacy means less intelligence.

Somehow, this connection seems to have been lost, and governments everywhere are poorer as a result.

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The past few posts have focused on the potential role of diplomacy in addressing the complex challenges of counterinsurgency.

Can non-violent approaches to conflict resolution make a difference?

Yes, but it is unlikely that contribution cannot be fully realized under present circumstances.

It is not just that the diplomatic business model has not responded adequately to the challenges of globalization – it hasn’t – or that foreign ministries are underfunded, hierarchic and risk-averse – they are. These features compound the problem, but it is the particular difficulties in the field that define it.

When political officers and aid workers have to spend much of their time cooped up inside heavily guarded compounds or within the premises of provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs), they can’t engender the legitimacy and credibility required for successful cooperation.

Similarly, diplomatic best practices do not typically include by rolling up for a meeting in an intimidating armoured column, or visiting  an important contact in the company of a close protection squad.

In other words, if diplomacy and development activities are framed within a set of mission parameters dominated by the defence component, they will be unable to deliver the results required. Moreover, if foreign troops are seen by the local population to have taken sides in a civil war, or are perceived as an occupying force rather than as liberators, then at a certain point their sheer presence – and in some cases that of their unarmed countrymen – can become an issue.

This combination produces a pernicious form of double jeopardy, with the effect of exacerbating rather than resolving underlying problems.

In treating conflicts based on cultural, religious, clan, tribal or ethnic differences, the use of force is unlikely to prove the best option. A reliance upon impregnable bases, air power and high-tech weaponry may reduce infantry casualties, but it also tends to increase “collateral,” or unintended damage, which fuels feelings of humiliation and resentment and contributes to the intensification of a broader backlash.  When a Predator drone fires on a wedding party, or a taxi driver gets shot for failing to stop when a NATO convoy passes, confidence, trust and respect are quickly replaced by anger and a desire for retribution.

If you fight your enemy where they live, then any victory, especially in the absence of a massive, long-term occupation and immediate, broad-spectrum reconstruction, will be Phyrric.  If you happen to be deployed abroad as what one author has referred to as an “imperial grunt” then you are likely to find yourself in the country of your opponent’s birth, unable to easily distinguish between friend and foe. In wars amongst the people,  the enemy lives there, speaks the language, and is steeped in the culture. As long as the conditions which gave rise to the insurrection persist, the insurgents will have access to an inexhaustible source of new recruits. They will always have better intelligence, and can’t be driven out because they have nowhere else to go.

Western militaries rarely lose battles against an irregular opposition, but that does not mean winning wars.  As the years grind on, the home grown resistance will almost certainly outlast the will of the outsiders, waiting until the accumulation of casualties produces a political crisis at home and the foreign forces are forced to withdraw.

Such  observations  may help to account for ISAF’s ongoing difficulties in making appreciable headway in Afghanistan after almost a decade in theatre. But most of these arguments could have been advanced just as convincingly in 1969, when the military victory over the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese in the wake of the Tet Offensive accelerated political defeat on the home front by giving lie to claims that progress was being made.

Armed force is both too sharp and too dull an international policy instrument to be relied upon in addressing the vexing problems of the globalization age. If, as a last resort, military action is absolutely necessary, then it must be conducted discriminately, and as an integral part of an over-arching strategic framework grounded firmly in a deep understanding of local conditions and long term development challenges.

Otherwise, it’s blowback, redux.

If given the chance, political officers, and perhaps especially those attuned to the ways of guerrilla diplomacy, could contribute  materially to generating that kind of understanding. But to succeed, the diplomats will require not only adequate resources, but also a place in the mainstream, rather than the margins of contemporary thinking about international security.

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